Does it work? evaluating a new pay system by Corby, Susan et al.
  
Does it work? Evaluating a New Pay System 
 
 
Susan Corby, Geoff White, Paul Dennison,  Fiona Douglas
 i
 
 
Enquiries concerning this report should be address to: 
 
Susan Corby, Work & Employment Research Unit, The Business School, University of 
Greenwich, 
Old Royal Naval College, Park Row, London SE10 9LS 
Email: S.R.Corby@gre.ac.uk 
Tel: 020 8331 8200 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002 
 
 
ISBN: 1 86166 187 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and are not necessarily 
those of the Department of Health or any other government department. 
 ii
 
DOES IT WORK? EVALUATING A NEW PAY SYSTEM 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Executive Summary _____________________________________________________________________ vii 
Overview of the report’s structure___________________________________________________________ 1 
Part I: Evaluating pay changes: the literature _________________________________________________ 2 
1.1 Introduction _________________________________________________________________________ 2 
1.2 Strategic HRM and the ‘bottom line’ _____________________________________________________ 3 
1.2.1 Approaches to HR strategy__________________________________________________________ 3 
1.2.2 Empirical studies _________________________________________________________________ 3 
1.2.3 Is there a direct link? ______________________________________________________________ 4 
1.2.4 Evaluating HR strategy_____________________________________________________________ 5 
1.3 Evaluating the HR function _____________________________________________________________ 5 
1.3.1 Quantitative and qualitative measures _________________________________________________ 5 
1.4 Measuring reward practices_____________________________________________________________ 8 
1.4.1 Incentive payment systems__________________________________________________________ 9 
1.4.2 Perspectives on pay systems________________________________________________________ 10 
1.4.3 Pay audits ______________________________________________________________________ 10 
1.4.4 The public sector ________________________________________________________________ 11 
1.5 Summary __________________________________________________________________________ 12 
Part II NHS trusts _______________________________________________________________________ 13 
2.1 Background ________________________________________________________________________ 13 
2.2 The research _______________________________________________________________________ 13 
2.2.1 Research questions _______________________________________________________________ 13 
2.2.2 Sample and methods______________________________________________________________ 13 
2.3 Findings___________________________________________________________________________ 16 
2.3.1 Aims and objectives ______________________________________________________________ 16 
2.3.2 Evaluation______________________________________________________________________ 16 
2.4 Further steps _______________________________________________________________________ 19 
2.5 Summary __________________________________________________________________________ 20 
Part III: Organisations outside the NHS_____________________________________________________ 21 
3. 1 Introduction _______________________________________________________________________ 21 
3.2 The research _______________________________________________________________________ 21 
3.2.1 The research questions ____________________________________________________________ 21 
3.2.2 Sample and methods______________________________________________________________ 21 
3.3 The findings________________________________________________________________________ 24 
3.3.1 Aims and objectives ______________________________________________________________ 24 
3.3.2 Evaluation______________________________________________________________________ 26 
3.3.2.1 Evaluation by managers________________________________________________________ 26 
3.3.2.2 Evaluation by unions __________________________________________________________ 30 
3.3.2.3 Problems in evaluation ________________________________________________________ 31 
3.3.3 Further steps ____________________________________________________________________ 32 
3.4 Summary __________________________________________________________________________ 33 
Part IV Discussion, conclusions and template ________________________________________________ 34 
4.1 Discussion and conclusions____________________________________________________________ 34 
4.1.1 Themes ________________________________________________________________________ 34 
4.1.2 Conclusions ____________________________________________________________________ 35 
4.2 Template __________________________________________________________________________ 36 
4.2.1 Considerations __________________________________________________________________ 36 
4.2.2 The approach ___________________________________________________________________ 37 
4.2.3 The measures ___________________________________________________________________ 37 
4.2.4 The process_____________________________________________________________________ 41 
4.3 Final comment______________________________________________________________________ 42 
 iii
ANNEX________________________________________________________________________________ 44 
A. 1. Assureco _________________________________________________________________________ 44 
A.1.1 Overview ______________________________________________________________________ 44 
A.1.2 Context _______________________________________________________________________ 44 
A.1.3 Background ____________________________________________________________________ 44 
A.1.4 Aims and objectives______________________________________________________________ 45 
A.1.5 The pay and grading system _______________________________________________________ 45 
A.1.5.1 The grading structure _________________________________________________________ 45 
A.1.5.2 Pay progression______________________________________________________________ 46 
A.1.5.3.Anchor points _______________________________________________________________ 47 
A.1.6 Evaluation _____________________________________________________________________ 47 
A.1.7 Comment ______________________________________________________________________ 48 
A.2 BAE Systems ______________________________________________________________________ 48 
A.2.1 Overview ______________________________________________________________________ 48 
A.2.2 Context _______________________________________________________________________ 49 
A.2.3 Background ____________________________________________________________________ 49 
A.2.4 Aims and objectives______________________________________________________________ 49 
A.2.5 The new salary structure __________________________________________________________ 50 
A.2.6 Evaluation _____________________________________________________________________ 50 
A.2.7 Comment ______________________________________________________________________ 51 
A.3  Council __________________________________________________________________________ 52 
A.3.1 Overview ______________________________________________________________________ 52 
A.3.2 Context _______________________________________________________________________ 52 
A.3.3 Background ____________________________________________________________________ 52 
A.3.4 Aims and Objectives _____________________________________________________________ 52 
A.3.5 The details _____________________________________________________________________ 53 
A.3.5.1 Developing the new pay and grading system _______________________________________ 53 
A.3.5.2 Implementation______________________________________________________________ 53 
A.3.6 Evaluation _____________________________________________________________________ 55 
A.3.7 Comment ______________________________________________________________________ 56 
A.4 GCHQ____________________________________________________________________________ 56 
A.4.1 Overview ______________________________________________________________________ 56 
A.4.2 Context _______________________________________________________________________ 56 
A.4.3 Background ____________________________________________________________________ 57 
A.4.4 Aims and objectives______________________________________________________________ 57 
A.4.5 Details ________________________________________________________________________ 57 
A.4.6 Evaluation _____________________________________________________________________ 58 
A.4.7 Comment ______________________________________________________________________ 59 
A.5 HM Customs and Excise _____________________________________________________________ 59 
A.5.1 Overview ______________________________________________________________________ 59 
A.5.2 Context _______________________________________________________________________ 60 
A.5.3 Background ____________________________________________________________________ 60 
A.5.4 Aims and objectives______________________________________________________________ 60 
A.5.5 Setting up the trial _______________________________________________________________ 60 
A.5.6 The evaluation __________________________________________________________________ 61 
A.5.7 Comment ______________________________________________________________________ 61 
A.6 Royal Mail ________________________________________________________________________ 62 
A.6.1 Overview ______________________________________________________________________ 62 
A.6.2 Context _______________________________________________________________________ 62 
A.6.3 Background ____________________________________________________________________ 63 
A.6.4 Aims and objectives______________________________________________________________ 63 
A.6.5 The details _____________________________________________________________________ 64 
A.6.6 Evaluation _____________________________________________________________________ 64 
A.6.7 Comment ______________________________________________________________________ 66 
A.7 Telecomco ________________________________________________________________________ 67 
A.7.1 Overview ______________________________________________________________________ 67 
A.7.2 Context _______________________________________________________________________ 67 
A.7.3 Background ____________________________________________________________________ 67 
A.7.4 Aims and objectives______________________________________________________________ 68 
A.7.5 The new pay system______________________________________________________________ 69 
A.7.5.1 The pay and grading structure __________________________________________________ 69 
 iv
A.7.5.2 Pay progression______________________________________________________________ 69 
A.7.5.3 Pay and pension protection_____________________________________________________ 70 
A.7.5.4 Terms and conditions _________________________________________________________ 70 
A.7.5.5 Implementation______________________________________________________________ 70 
A.7.6  Evaluation_____________________________________________________________________ 71 
A.7.7 Comment ______________________________________________________________________ 72 
Glossary _______________________________________________________________________________ 73 
References _____________________________________________________________________________ 74 
 
 
 
TABLE OF TABLES 
 
 
Table 1. 1 Evaluating the HR function .................................................................................................................... 7 
 
Table 2. 1 NHS trust by region and number of employees.................................................................................... 14 
Table 2. 2 Pay arrangements in NHS trusts........................................................................................................... 15 
Table 2. 3 One-off evaluation exercises ................................................................................................................ 18 
 
Table 3. 1 Organisation by number of employees ................................................................................................. 22 
Table 3. 2 Pay arrangements by organisation........................................................................................................ 23 
Table 3. 3 Interviews conducted............................................................................................................................ 24 
Table 3. 4  Main aims of new pay arrangements ................................................................................................... 25 
Table 3. 5 Evaluation tools used specifically in respect of new pay arrangements ............................................... 29 
 
Table 4. 1 Measures of evaluation......................................................................................................................... 38 
 
Table A. 1 The banding structure at Assureco ...................................................................................................... 45 
Table A. 2 Anchor points at Assureco................................................................................................................... 47 
Table A. 3 Professional staff salary structure at BAE Systems............................................................................. 50 
Table A. 4 The pay and grading structure at Council ............................................................................................ 54 
Table A. 5 Assimilation provisions at Council...................................................................................................... 54 
 
 
 
TABLE OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 Levels of measurement (Kearns)............................................................................................................... 8 
Figure 2 Measures for evaluation .......................................................................................................................... 41 
Figure 3 The process of evaluation........................................................................................................................ 41 
 
 v
 vi
Does it Work? Evaluating a new pay system     Executive Summary 
Executive Summary 
 
A. Scope and objectives 
 
This report focuses on the evaluation of the impact of new pay systems in large, unionised 
multi-site organisations by the organisations themselves. Evaluation of the effectiveness of a 
pay system, however, does not take place in a vacuum and relates to the aims and objectives 
of the pay system concerned. Moreover, evaluation is not an end in itself. It is, therefore, 
relevant to consider if any further steps were taken as a result of evaluation. Accordingly our 
research questions were: 
 
• What were the aims and objectives of organisations when introducing new pay 
arrangements? 
• What data did organisations collect and review to inform their evaluation? 
• What steps have organisations taken as a result of their evaluation? 
 
We re-appraised our data from 10 NHS trusts in England which had introduced some 
innovations in pay and grading in the 1990s. Additionally, we looked at seven multi-site 
unionised organisations outside the NHS in both the public and private sectors, which had 
recently made changes to their reward systems, carrying out interviews and inspecting 
documents.  
 
The main output is a template for the evaluation of Agenda for Change by NHS organisations. 
 
B. Background 
 
Our findings on the evaluation of pay systems by organisations inside and outside the NHS 
were placed in context by reviewing the literature.  There was little research reporting on 
actual organisational experience in monitoring and evaluating changes in human resource 
(HR) practices, as opposed to academic studies. Accordingly, we drew first on the academic 
literature on human resources (HR) and the bottom line. There have been many empirical 
studies by academics seeking to investigate the link between HR practices and business 
performance and they have mostly reported positive statistical relationships.  There may, 
however, be reverse causality, ie successful organisations invest in HR, rather than certain HR 
practices leading to improved performance. Also, most academics would agree that the link 
between HR strategies or practices and business performance is indirect, not direct. Moreover 
the process, or management style, is a significant mediator; the evaluation model required is 
complex; and the qualitative nature of many HR objectives, eg employee commitment, which 
in turn may lead to business outcomes, are not easy to measure. 
 
Second, we drew on the literature on evaluating the HR function which suggested various 
quantitative and qualitative measures. Third, we examined the literature concerned with 
measuring reward practices. The importance of setting out clearly the objectives and costs 
were emphasised. Turning specifically to the evaluation of incentive systems, we noted that 
whereas studies in the 1950s and 1960s sought to look at changes over time in the workplace, 
recent studies of incentive systems were largely cross-sectional rather than longitudinal, 
perhaps because of the costs involved. Fourth, we discussed the literature on auditing pay 
systems to ensure that they were retaining their effectiveness. Finally, we discussed the 
problems of measuring the impact of reward systems in the public services, particularly in 
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respect of productivity. In the NHS there is a further problem of aggregating the volumes of 
many very different types of activity. 
 
C. Findings 
 
The aims of NHS trust varied but there were certain common threads: affordability, 
simplicity, flexibility, the reward of good performance and the overcoming of recruitment and 
retention problems. Evaluation of the new pay arrangements against these aims was, however, 
on the whole limited. Although trusts collected much HR information, for instance labour 
turnover statistics, and carried out staff attitude surveys, essentially they did not use the data 
to evaluate their pay systems or make use of a control group (ie staff who had not moved on 
to the new pay system). Some trusts, however, conducted certain one-off exercises to evaluate 
a specific aspect of their new pay arrangements, but in no trust was there a longitudinal 
exercise. In two trusts a university evaluated the performance pay system, but the academics 
approached these trusts for access. The trusts did not commission the academics. In a further 
trust a student evaluated the new theatre pay system as his dissertation for a Masters in 
Business Administration (MBA). Only two trusts made marginal changes to their pay 
systems. In one trust this stemmed from the trust’s evaluation. In the other trust it was 
primarily in response to representations by the staff side.  
 
Looking at organisations outside the NHS we found a range of aims of their new pay systems 
including simplification, harmonisation, overcoming recruitment and retention problems, 
flexibility and the provision of equal pay for work of equal value. Although the organisations 
which we studied routinely collected a considerable amount of HR data, they used only some 
of the data to measure the impact of their pay system against the stated aims and, like the 
NHS trusts, mostly conducted only a modicum of evaluation. The exceptions were HM 
Customs & Excise (C & E) and Royal Mail. At the former, where there was extensive 
evaluation, the new pay arrangement was a trial and it was possible to use control groups to 
evaluate staff attitudes and financial performance. At Royal Mail a complex evaluation 
system had been set up based on a range of data informing joint management/union reviews, 
but this evaluation had in practice not occurred because of implementation problems. Finally, 
we were unable to discover steps taken by organisations as a result of their evaluation, except 
at C & E. 
  
Although our literature review indicated that evaluation is less problematic in the private 
sector than the public sector, this was not borne out by our field-work. Private sector 
interviewees reported that profitability was too dependent upon external factors for financial 
indicators to be a useful measure of a pay system. 
 
D. Conclusions 
 
Several themes run through this report: first, the effectiveness of a pay system may be seen 
differently by different stakeholders; second, process has an effect on outcome; third, all 
measures have an element of subjectivity, eg the choice of data to be collected and the 
interpretation of the measures used. Furthermore, rigorous evaluation is a methodologically 
complex process: in a business environment it is virtually impossible to keep all the internal 
and external variables constant except a reward system and prevent other changes taking place 
at the same time in the organisation. Other complications stem from the fact that the link 
between a pay system and a business outcome is indirect and that many desired outcomes 
from a change in a reward system, such as improved employee commitment, are inherently 
difficult to measure. 
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Our research, however, suggests some other reasons why evaluation was often not conducted. 
Managers are busy people and evaluation carries a cost, particularly if it is longitudinal.  
Above all, however, organisations have little incentive to evaluate. The design and negotiation 
of a new pay system often takes several years and there are often significant costs of 
introduction. If anecdotally it is reported that the new pay arrangements are working 
satisfactorily, managers may consider that that there is little need to conduct in-depth 
evaluation. Also, after spending a long time developing a new reward package, managers are 
likely to have a psychological investment in its success and may be unwilling to delve if there 
are no apparent problems. 
 
E. Template
 
When drawing up a template for the evaluation of Agenda for Change (AfC) there are a 
number of considerations as follows: 
 
• A balance must be struck between data gathering and imposing a burden on managers. 
• Evaluation carries a cost. 
• A policy decision has to be taken in the NHS as to whether evaluation is conducted 
wholly or in part at national or local level. 
• Pay systems, if they are to be evaluated rigorously, should be evaluated longitudinally and 
not at a single point in time. 
• If possible control groups should be found. 
• There are advantages and disadvantages methodologically with every evaluation measure. 
• There are particular methodological problems in evaluating productivity in the NHS and 
in using patient satisfaction surveys to measure the impact of a new pay system. 
• Some data, already collected by trusts for other purposes, can be used to evaluate AfC, so 
the need to collect further data will be limited. 
• Costs must be set against savings, though both some costs and some savings are difficult 
to quantify. 
• Measurement is not an end in itself and institutional mechanisms are needed to consider 
evaluation reports. 
 
Table 4.1 on page 38 proposes some evaluation measures in response to the principles and 
intentions set out in the statement agreed by the AfC negotiators in October 1999. 
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Overview of the report’s structure 
 
This report, which is organised in four parts, focuses on the evaluation of the impact of new 
pay systems in large, unionised multi-site organisations. Our research questions were:  
 
• What were the aims and objectives of organisations when introducing new pay 
arrangements? 
• What data did organisations collect and review to inform their evaluation? 
• What steps have organisations taken as a result of their evaluation? 
 
Part I considers the literature. It draws on academic studies evaluating the impact of human 
resource (HR) practices on the performance of organisations, studies on the evaluation of the 
HR function and studies of the impact of incentive systems on organisational commitment. 
This is because there is little literature specifically reporting organisational practice when 
measuring the impact of changes in pay and grading.  
 
Part II focuses on the evaluation of new pay and grading systems undertaken by NHS trusts. 
It re-appraises the data collected for our previous study (Corby et al. 2001).  
 
Part III is concerned with how organisations outside the NHS, which have introduced new 
pay arrangements, have conducted their evaluation. It is a cross-case analysis of seven multi-
site, unionised organisations.  
 
There are short summaries at the end of the first three parts of the report.  
 
Part IV draws together and discusses our findings and the literature.  
We end with a template for the evaluation of Agenda for Change.  
 
Case studies of the organisations which form the basis of our analysis in part III are contained 
in the annex to this report. A glossary and references are located at the back. 
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Part I: Evaluating pay changes: the literature 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
There is very little original research which reports on organisational experience in monitoring 
and evaluating changes in human resource (HR) practices, including a change in a pay 
system. Yet it has been widely recognised that pay systems represent both a significant 
business cost and can also be a significant contributor to business success. The Chartered 
Institute of Personnel and Development’s (CIPD) advisory staff reported that the Institute’s 
programme of research on people management and business performance had found little 
evidence that organisations were monitoring and evaluating changes in HR practices, despite 
the call for such action in much of the prescriptive literature. Discussions with a leading 
reward management consultant with a major consultancy firm specialising in pay confirmed 
this general view, as did a full search of the CIPD library. 
 
There is, however, a growing literature reporting academic studies on the relationship of 
human resource management (HRM) practices to organisational performance. These studies 
by academics are aimed primarily at an academic audience but there is a parallel literature by 
management writers and consultants, dealing with benchmarking the human resource 
management function within organisations, aimed primarily at a practitioner audience. 
Drawing on these two bodies of literature, we have identified salient points to be considered 
when monitoring and measuring the outcomes of changes in pay and grading systems. 
 
A key finding of this literature review is the strong divide between the academic oriented 
literature and the practitioner oriented literature. The academic oriented literature tends 
largely to rely on quantitative analyses of large datasets, such as the Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey. The practitioner oriented literature is often prescriptive, rather than 
descriptive of what organisations actually do, with lists of ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ and aimed 
primarily at justifying the HR function’s role within organisations. In a major review of the 
literature on the impact of HR upon business performance, Richardson and Thompson 
(1999:25) comment that ‘it was clear from the discussions that practitioners are not generally 
aware of the growing body of evidence on HR strategies and business performance’. This lack 
of awareness was attributed to ‘the highly quantitative nature of the existing work (which 
makes severe demands on the reader and also limits its wider appeal) and the fact that most of 
the published research is of US origin (and both more difficult to access and relate to)’.  
 
Against this background our literature review first looks at the literature on ‘HR and the 
bottom line’, reviewing the debate on strategic HRM and whether clear linkages can be made 
between HR practices and improved business performance. Second, we discuss the 
practitioner oriented literature on benchmarking the HR function and the evaluation tools 
which are recommended. Third, we turn specifically to remuneration: the academic studies 
seeking to measure the impact of incentive systems on employee commitment and the 
literature on auditing a pay system. We conclude this part of the report by looking at the 
problems of measuring the impact of reward systems in the public services.  
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1.2  Strategic HRM and the ‘bottom line’ 
 
‘Managers know that the way people are managed and developed affects the bottom line, but the difficulties 
of evaluation have, until now, limited the arguments that can be made in favour of more sophisticated, 
systematic approaches to people management. In the last few years the situation has begun to change, and a 
body of hard evidence is now emerging which demonstrates that the way people are managed is a crucial 
factor in predicting business performance’, Angela Baron, CIPD (quoted in Richardson and Thompson, 
1999 vii).  
1.2.1 Approaches to HR strategy 
 
The literature on HRM and the bottom line follows three broad perspectives (Richardson and 
Thompson, 1999): 
 
• best or ‘universalistic’ practice – one set of HR practices can be identified which raise 
business performance (eg Pfeffer, 1994, 1998; Huselid, 1995;); 
• contingency – business performance will be improved only when the right fit is found 
between business strategy and HR practice (eg Schuler and Jackson, 1987; Gomez-Mejia 
and Balkin, 1992);  
• bundles or configuration– specific combinations of HR practices can be identified which 
generate higher business performance but these ‘bundles’ will vary between organisations 
(eg Arthur, 1992; MacDuffie, 1995; Ichniowski et al, 1997). 
 
It is important, however, to note that most organisations do not arrive at their strategies 
through a conscious set of decisions linked to organisational goals. ‘On the contrary, most 
organisations operate on a piecemeal basis, responding to sudden emergent pressures, and are 
subject to a variety of powerful internal political pressures which contribute to inconsistencies 
among their policy choices’ (Richardson and Thompson, 1999:3). 
 
1.2.2 Empirical studies 
 
Taking these three perspectives/approaches together, there have been around 30 empirical 
studies that have sought to investigate the link between HR practices and business 
performance. Most of these studies, as noted in section 1.1, are from North America (eg 
Huselid, 1995; Becker and Gerhart, 1996; Delaney and Huselid, 1996;) but there is a growing 
number of European programmes of work devoted to this subject (eg Hiltrop, 1996a; Guest, 
1997; Richardson and Thompson, 1999). Most of this research generally reports positive 
statistical relationships between certain HR practices and business performance. In a review 
of the research, Pfeffer (1998) cites evidence that HR practices can raise shareholder value, 
while Huselid and Becker (1996) suggest that market value per employee is strongly 
correlated with the level of sophistication in the HR practices adopted. In the UK, researchers 
at the University of Sheffield (Patterson et al, 1997) conducted a study of 60 small to 
medium-sized single-site manufacturing businesses and found a strong correlation between 
changes in profitability and the adoption of certain HR practices. There has been a keen 
interest in identifying those HR practices which lead to ‘high commitment’ among employees 
(Wood, 1996).   
 
This HRM and business performance literature has been extensively debated by academics; 
see Legge (2001) for example. Legge makes the point that any association between a new HR 
practice and a business outcome does not necessarily equate to a causative correlation. 
Alternatively, there may be ‘reverse causality’ in the linkage between HR practices and 
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organisational success (ie successful organisations decide to invest in human resources rather 
than HRM leading to improved performance).  
 
1.2.3 Is there a direct link? 
 
Legge  also argues that ‘little has been done to unlock the “black box” of the processes that 
link HRM … with organisational performance’ (Legge 2001:29). This leads on to a key 
question in the context of this report: whether there is a direct linkage between changes in HR 
policies and practices and improvements in business performance. Gerhart and Milkovich 
(1992: 483) argue: ‘Compensation may directly influence key outcomes like job satisfaction, 
attraction, retention, performance, flexibility, co-operation, skill acquisition, and so forth.’ 
The effect of compensation on the bottom line, however, is more problematic. 
   
Guest (1997) suggests that the linkage needs to be seen as a sequence. He says that HRM 
strategy determines HRM practices, which result in HR outcomes. These HRM outcomes then 
impact on behaviour, performance and financial outcomes. He admits, however, that further 
research is needed, including research on the nature of the linkages. In a similar vein, 
Richardson and Thompson (1999) suggest that the linkage needs to be seen as a chain of 
events, leading from generic HR objectives (eg competence) through behavioural objectives 
(eg productivity) to production objectives (reduction in unit labour costs), which in turn lead 
to ultimate business objectives (profit). There is, therefore, little direct linkage between a 
specific HR practice and a business outcome.  
 
There are also choices in management style which can affect this linkage. Under a control 
style, which Walton locates within the scientific management approach, the major objective is 
‘to establish order, exercise control and achieve efficiency’ (Walton 1985:78). Employee 
voice has little role in this situation, except where trade unions provide an adversarial 
challenge to management. Under a commitment style of management, ‘performance 
expectations are high and serve not to define minimum standards but to provide “stretch 
objectives”, emphasise continuous improvement, and reflect the requirements of the 
marketplace’ (Walton 1985:79). Equally important to the commitment approach is providing 
employees with security and voice in decision making. While all organisations tend to have 
the same broad HR policy areas, Walton argues that the specific HR practices employed will 
be different according to the management style adopted. Thus all organisations have to make 
decisions about selection, training, work design, etc and have similar overall business 
objectives but the way these decisions are taken will depend on the management style. It is, 
therefore, the process (which takes place between the aims and objectives of the HR strategy 
and the ultimate outcomes) that is central, the so-called ‘black box’.  
 
Indeed, there are more than the two possible approaches to managing human resources 
identified by Walton. See for example Chadwick and Cappelli (1998), who posit ‘contract’ 
versus ‘investment’ relationships), but the point is that, while overall HR objectives may be 
the same, the choice of employment policies will vary according to the management style. A 
HR strategy can, therefore, be seen as a series of decisions about which employment policies 
are best suited to achieving the generic organisational objectives. 
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1.2.4 Evaluating HR strategy 
 
We have seen that there are generic HR objectives which are achieved in different ways 
according to the management style adopted and that the management style, ie the process, 
affects the linkage between HR strategy and business outcomes; but how are HR strategies or 
practices evaluated?  Richardson and Thompson (1999:12) divide evaluation into two 
questions. The first asks whether various HR strategies are successful in terms of the impact 
upon business performance. The second (which in practice is much less frequently 
considered) seeks to identify why a strategy is successful or not. In terms of the first question, 
an evaluation requires an identification of the HR strategy, its measurement and finally its 
relationship to a measure of business performance. Also the researcher has to take account of 
the fact that many things apart from HR strategy will affect business performance (so-called 
‘background noise’) and hence the effect of HR on business performance needs to be isolated 
in some way from other determinants. In the words of Richardson and Thompson (1999:13), 
‘this requires a very complex evaluation model’.  
 
The complexity inherent in this process is demonstrated by Richardson and Thompson’s 
examination of a single HR practice, performance-related pay, which has been extensively 
researched by academics, but without a conclusive outcome. A key point, however, from the 
literature is that any evaluation rests on being able to specify clearly the thing being 
evaluated. A further point is that the qualitative nature of many HR objectives, eg improving 
employee motivation, are not easy to measure (Hiltrop, 1996b). 
 
1.3 Evaluating the HR function 
 
Historically, the HR function has defied quantification or measurement. This has left HR 
professionals ‘ill-prepared to demonstrate that human resources are a form of capital, not 
solely a line entry of expense’ (McDonald and Smith,1995:59).  Nevertheless, in recent years 
the development of the human resource management paradigm (ie effective management of 
people leads to organisational success) has required a more systematic justification of the 
personnel management role (see, for example, Hiltrop, 1996b). As Tyson and Fell (1992:104) 
suggest: ‘In spite of all the difficulties, the need for personnel specialists to ensure that they 
both help to create wealth and to obtain recognition for their work is such that the attempt to 
measure performance must be made’. There has, therefore, been a growing literature which 
seeks to provide methods for evaluating the HR function. In this report we are primarily 
concerned to investigate how organisations monitor and evaluate the effects of changes in HR 
practice (ie pay and grading systems), rather than measuring the contribution of the HR 
function per se; but this literature does provide useful indications about how HR practices can 
be measured and evaluated. 
 
1.3.1 Quantitative and qualitative measures 
 
Any evaluation requires clear criteria, ie metrics or standards by which outcomes of the 
process can be evaluated. These measures can be as follows: 
 
• employee behaviour (eg absenteeism or resignations); 
• employee attitudes (eg trust in management or employee commitment); 
• broader measures such as labour productivity, profits or stock market prices.  
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One might also investigate linkages between the behavioural and attitudinal measures and the 
broader quantitative measures.  As Gratton (1999:75) says:  
 
The emphasis in metrics has historically been on financial measures such as profitability or return on 
assets. However, for those companies striving to create strong linkage with business strategy, the 
emphasis has to be metrics associated with all aspects of business strategy, not simply financial targets.  
 
According to Ulrich and Lake (1990), the processes have to be capable of measuring a wide 
range of outcomes, including those requiring ‘softer’ measures such as customer satisfaction, 
innovation or team building competencies.  
 
In discussing the evaluation criteria by which the impact of HR practices can be judged, 
Armstrong and Long (1994) state that the overall approach to evaluating the HR function 
should distinguish between process and output or the difference between efficiency and 
effectiveness.  According to Walker (1992), when companies measure the efficiency of the 
human resource function, they usually rely on a series of quantitative measures (eg costs, 
response time and output volume relative to inputs) and relate results to short-term human 
resource activities. In contrast, effectiveness is primarily measured through qualitative 
information and relates results to the resolution of critical issues and the implementation of 
strategies. Many organisations rate the effectiveness of the human resource function in terms 
of perceptions (of managers and employees) ‘but few measure the effectiveness in relation to 
implementing human resource strategy and achieving specific objectives’ (Walker 1992:332).  
 
Tsui and Gomez-Mejia (1998) list several types of performance measures which can be used:  
 
• money measures – for example maximum income, minimum expenditure and improving 
rates of return; 
• time measures – express performance against work timetables, backlog and speed of 
activity or response; 
• measures of effect - including attainment of a standard, changes in behaviour, physical 
completion of work and level of take-up of a service; 
• reaction – such as peer assessments, performance ratings by clients or analysis of 
consumers’ complaints. 
 
Guest and Peccei (1994) suggests the following performance measures may be used: 
 
¾ organisational effectiveness – but it may be difficult to separate out HR; 
¾ specified goals – if good measures of goal attainment can be obtained; 
¾ specific quantified measures – labour costs, turnover and productivity have high 
credibility but may be difficult to interpret and can be affected by non-HRM factors; 
¾ shareholder perspective – eg the board. 
 
Armstrong and Long (1994) describe the approaches to evaluation of the HR function set out 
in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1. 1 Evaluating the HR function 
Approach Basis 
Macro - organisational Quantitative 
 
Micro -specified aspects of 
employee behaviour or 
reaction 
Quantitative/qualitative 
 
Achievement of specified 
goals 
Qualitative Macro -overall & largely 
subjective 
Qualitative 
 
Client satisfaction 
Qualitative 
 
Employee satisfaction 
Source: Armstrong and Long, 1994 
 
Armstrong and Long (1994) say that organisational (macro) quantitative criteria include: 
 
• added value per employee; 
• profit per employee; 
• sales value per employee; 
• costs per employee; 
• added value per pound of employee costs. 
 
Specific (micro) quantitative criteria include: 
 
¾ retention and turnover rates; 
¾ absenteeism rate; 
¾ ratio of employee suggestions received to number of employees; 
¾ frequency/severity rate of accidents; 
¾ ratio of grievances to number of employees; 
¾ time lost through disputes; 
¾ number of references to employment tribunals. 
 
A report by the Institute of Employment Studies (Hirsch et al, 1996:41) suggests that there are 
three different types of measures: hard, soft and process. It says: 
  
Although at first sight ‘objectives’ or ‘targets’ to be achieved seem like a separate category of measure, 
in practice these are nearly always some combination of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ measures. Summarising a set 
of objectives, goals or targets, however, can be a very useful way of integrating different measures of 
effectiveness, and making them visible both to those in the personnel function and those outside.  
 
 
In contrast to the view that quantitative and qualitative measures are of equal worth, Kearns 
(1995:4) argues that the evaluation of HR must be rigorous and that the ultimate form of 
measurement must involve quantitative data, see figure 1. The figure, which shows the levels 
of measurement an organisation may use, illustrates how measurement runs from the 
subjective to the objective. Kearns does, however, indicate that ‘for those not employed by 
overtly commercial organisations there might be a problem defining what or where your 
bottom line is’.  
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Figure 1 Levels of measurement (Kearns) 
Act of faith     Subjective      Nominal              Cost/benefit         Absolute                Bottom line 
                      assessment   measures                   measures          measures               measures 
0%                                                                                                                                       100% 
 
 
 
 
 
No measurement             Subjective/qualitative measures                                Objective measures 
                                                                                                                        
 
‘We think it             ‘It improved             ‘Put a             HR Dept          Cost,                    £££ 
worked’                   communications’     value on…’    audit                quality,              Profit 
                                                                                                       quantity              
 
 
Whereas Kearns considers that there are objective measures, Walker (1992) argues that 
whatever measures are used, they are inevitably tainted by subjectivity and the companies 
which he studied acknowledged that there was no truly objective measure of either human 
resource effectiveness or efficiency. He says:  
 
Each result … may be measured in specific, quantitative terms. However, all measures of effectiveness 
or efficiency have subjective elements – in the nature of the data (eg opinion), in the collection of 
information at the source, or in the formulation or interpretation of the measure itself. Interpretation … 
must be based on comparisons with expectations or objectives, with accepted standards… or with 
benchmarks, thus bringing an element of subjective judgment into play (Walker 1992: 336).   
 
He adds that the companies recognised that overemphasis on measurement could cause 
managers to lose sight of the purpose of evaluation.   
 
1.4 Measuring reward practices 
 
The measurement and evaluation of reward practices has been an element common to both the 
‘HR and the bottom line’ literature and the ‘evaluating the HR function’ literature, as we have 
noted. Reward practices themselves, however, have been evaluated by academics. As Gerhart 
and Milkovich (1992:482) argue: ‘From the organisation’s perspective, perhaps no other set 
of decisions are as visible or as consequential for the success or failure of an organisation’. 
They also stress that the effects are not just about the impact upon cost, but also the impact 
upon a wide range of employee attitudes and behaviours, though as noted in sub-section 1.2.2 
the link between reward changes/employee attitudes/productivity is intricate. Similarly 
Gratton states: ‘Reward processes can be one of the greatest sources of leverage available to a 
company in its quest to increase organisational performance and effectiveness, yet remain one 
of the most underutilized and potentially complex tools for driving organisational 
performance’ (Gratton, 1999:176). Fair (1992:66) argues: ‘Remuneration is undoubtedly the 
most visible of all costs associated with HR, yet the least understood and controlled element’. 
This is due, says Fair, to the fragmented way in which every part of the organisation demands 
a say in remuneration, whilst none is prepared to accept ultimate accountability for its control.  
 
The importance and complexity of linking reward strategies to business goals in a systematic 
manner has been a recurrent theme in the research in this field, as has the importance and 
difficulty of linking rewards to the longer term view (see Hambrick and Snow, 1989). Much 
emphasis has been placed upon reward processes which are capable of reinforcing behaviours 
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crucial to business strategy (such as long term versus short term and customer focus versus 
financial results). Fair reports that, while official statistics are hard to find, individual 
organisations introducing clear reward structures have reported direct savings of at least 3-5 
per cent on the paybill in the first year alone (Fair 1992:69).  
 
Fitz-enz (1995:122) identifies four objectives for assessing the success of reward systems. 
First, a reward system must establish and maintain a structure that can be audited so that a 
judgment can be made on how it is operating against pre-set standards and goals. Second, as 
pay equity is important, we need to be able to determine how pay is distributed across all 
groups. Third, we can measure employee attitudes towards pay and fourth we ‘must deal with 
strategic issues of expense management and return on investment of base pay and incentive 
programmes’. Phillips (1996) suggests the following variables for measuring and evaluating 
pay systems: 
  
• productivity;  
• quality; 
• soft data such as employee attitude surveys. 
 
According to Phillips (1996:217), as well as measuring costs (which are part of productivity), 
there are administrative costs for implementing, co-ordinating and monitoring pay which can 
be measured. He also suggests that ‘time’ is an appropriate performance measure when a pay 
plan is linked with time improvements such as cycle times, delivery times, schedules, and 
completion time. 
 
Unfortunately the literature does not normally give details of the measures used by 
organisations in assessing the effectiveness of specific reward practices, nor does it provide a 
methodology for measuring changes in reward practices. A major exception is Tyson and Fell 
(1992). They argue that two questions are important: what are the objectives and what are the 
costs. They show how the computation of costs and wastage data enabled one company to 
calculate how a new salary policy for clerical staff, which gave more pay increases during the 
first year of service, would reduce costs and be self-financing. This computation was achieved 
by keeping records under employment cost headings eg recruitment/induction against labour 
turnover figures and a stability index. 
 
1.4.1 Incentive payment systems 
 
For a long time labour economists and industrial relations researchers have had an interest in 
whether and how certain reward practices, notably incentive or ‘contingent’ pay systems, 
affect productivity.  As far back as Taylor (1913), there was concern to show the beneficial 
effects of financial incentives for workers upon productivity. In the 1960s and 1970s there 
was continuing interest among industrial relations researchers in shopfloor incentive pay and 
productivity agreements and how they might affect output and quality (see Ahlstrand, 1990). 
In more recent times there has been research on the impact of worker financial participation 
schemes, such as profit sharing and employee share ownership (see Blinder, 1990); and a 
large amount of research on the effects of individual performance pay upon employee 
motivation, although less on its business impact (see for example Dowling and Richardson, 
1997; Marsden and French, 1998; Richardson, 1999).  Blinder (1990) found a strong 
correlation between employee financial participation schemes and strong business 
performance, while the literature on performance-related pay is generally more negative in its 
findings on the impact of such schemes. 
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One of the most challenging problems with this literature on the impact of pay practices on 
organisational performance is the fact that few recent studies have examined the introduction 
of a new pay practice. Rather, most of the recent research seeks to measure the business 
strength of organisations which have certain reward practices (eg profit sharing), compared to 
those which do not, rather than undertaking a ‘before and after’ study. Thus, few studies 
compare such matters as labour productivity, labour turnover or employee behaviour and 
attitudes before and after a change in reward practices.  In other words, the studies are 
essentially cross-sectional, not longitudinal, perhaps because longitudinal research is 
expensive/time consuming. This contrasts with earlier studies. Indeed, Taylor’s (1913) study 
of a machine shop in the USA is interesting, in addition to its historical value, in that it sought 
to measure such a change in reward practice upon employee behaviour.  While studies in the 
1960s and 1970s sought to examine in depth the impact of change over time in the workplace, 
including reward systems (for example Davenport, 1950; Whyte, 1952, Sayles, 1957; Brown, 
1962; Lupton, 1963; Sirota, 1966; Lupton and Gowler, 1969), such studies of change have 
been remarkably absent during the last two decades. 
 
Finally, when looking at contingent/incentive pay, Legge (2001:26) reminds us that Bowey 
and Thorpe (1986) found that it was not the type of pay system that affected the outcome, but 
the use of consultation in the design phase.  
 
1.4.2 Perspectives on pay systems 
 
Thorpe et al (2000) argue that a pay system will not necessarily convey the same messages to 
all those involved and that there are at least three main perspectives from which a payment 
system may be viewed. These are: 
 
• the ‘normative’ view (ie the view of the senior managers as to what the payment system is 
designed to achieve); 
• the ‘perceived view’ (ie the view of those who have to operate the system, which may 
differ from that of senior management); and  
• the ‘operative view’ (ie the view of those who have to work under the system). 
 
They argue  (2000:251): ‘In most organisations, wide differences are apparent between these 
three perspectives, leading to subversion of the system and conflict with resulting poor pay 
system performance’. They also indicate that it is only by bringing these three perspectives 
into alignment that the reward system can be used as a catalyst for wider organisational 
change.  
 
Guest (1997:266) makes a similar point about the importance of recognising different 
perspectives. He asks who the stakeholders are and argues that if we are to accept that there 
are different constituencies and various stakeholders we need multiple criteria of 
effectiveness. 
1.4.3 Pay audits 
 
There is also a literature concerning the auditing of a pay system to ensure that it is retaining 
its effectiveness (Percival, 1970; Bowey, 1989; Thorpe et al, 2000). Thorpe et al (2000:247) 
identify three reasons why organisations should regularly audit their reward systems: 
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• to test whether the original objectives are being met and whether the system is meeting the 
organisation’s current and future needs; 
• to test whether the implementation and operation of the system is producing the expected 
results; 
• to reflect changes in the organisation or environment which necessitates a new approach 
to reward. 
 
Thorpe et al (2000:271) suggest the following stages in an audit: 
 
1.  Assess what the organisation needs from its various systems for allocating rewards. 
2.  Consider payroll costs relative to added value (or to revenue, profit, sales value or output) 
over a review period. 
3.  Analyse any time for which performance-related pay is awarded without reference to the 
actual performance of the employee at that time (eg incentive pay during waiting time). 
4.  Examine the distribution of performance-related earnings between individuals and 
sections. 
5.  Measure performance-related pay as a percentage of total pay. 
6.  Investigate absenteeism and turnover of staff by section, grade and sex. 
7.  Assess the extent of overtime working and its distribution. 
8.  Study the extent of and requirement for shiftworking and its distribution. 
9.  Measure pay differentials between various groups and trends. 
10. Evaluate the consistency and logic of pay differentials. 
11. Compare wages/salaries, fringe benefits and remuneration systems with competing 
employers. 
12. Assess compliance with legal requirements. 
 
1.4.4 The public sector  
 
The literature discussed above is predominantly private sector. Most private sector 
organisations specify their overall business objective as the maximisation of profit or 
shareholder value. Richardson and Thompson (1999:4) say: ‘non-commercial organisations, 
such as NHS trusts or government agencies, often have more trouble in specifying their 
objectives in a satisfactory way’. In contrast, Kearns (1995) suggests that public sector 
organisations can specify targets such as the achievement of a Charter Mark or a 
predetermined customer service target. He argues that if targets do not exist, then this begs 
many questions and you cannot ‘move forward until such a “bottom line” series of objectives 
have been constructed’ (Kearns 1995:36).  
 
In fact, performance indicators are now common across the UK public services, along with 
‘league tables’ and the Audit Commission has played a major role in developing the 
methodology for measuring public service outcomes, including NHS outcomes. (See for 
instance Audit Commission, 2001). Moreover, hospitals are already judged by these 
performance indicators which reflect three main policy concerns: efficient use of resources, eg 
length of stay; value for money, eg ward staffing; and access, eg waiting times (Carter et al, 
1992). These performance indicators, however, have essentially been used to question large 
divergences between trusts and as yet attempts to link HR strategies and outcomes to these 
indicators are only in their infancy.  For instance a team at Aston University is engaged on a 
project linking HR policies and practices in the NHS with performance indicators.  
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Moreover, a performance indicator in a hospital, eg waiting times, or emergency re-
admissions, is one step removed from productivity. Hodgkinson (1999:474) in a recent study 
based on Australian local authorities argues that it is now accepted that measures of 
productivity should ‘include quality measures and that these outcome measures need to reflect 
client expectations, the objectives of the programme and professional standards of quality’. 
Improvements in efficiency or cost reductions, however, may have the effect of reducing 
quality of service delivery. She says: ‘Productivity measures which will be acceptable to all 
parties [management and unions]… thus need to include quality of service delivery indicators 
and technical or cost efficiency measures’. 
 
In the UK the Office of National Statistics (ONS) has embarked upon a project to provide a 
measure of public services productivity. This study argues: ‘A shortcoming of existing 
productivity measures lies in the sharp differences between the market and non-market sectors 
as regards the way productivity is measured’ (Pritchard, 2001:61). Until recently, the practice 
was to assume that productivity in producing government services was constant and that, over 
time, there was no change in the quality of the services produced.  The ONS project is 
designed to measure the extent to which growth in the volume of output exceeds (or 
otherwise) growth in the volume of inputs, but this work is only just beginning and the first 
experimental statistics are expected in 2002. The NHS is also seeking to develop measures of 
unit labour costs. At this juncture, however, as Wanless (2001:198) says: ‘…there are 
significant problems in measuring labour productivity in the NHS to ensure that quality of 
care rather than just the volume of activity is properly taken into account. There is the further 
problem of aggregating the volumes of many very different types of activity.’ 
 
1.5 Summary 
 
There is very little research reporting on organisational practices in monitoring and evaluating 
HR changes, including new reward systems. Accordingly we have drawn on the academic 
‘HR and the bottom line’ literature and the literature on benchmarking the HR function. The 
former literature generally reports positive statistical associations between certain HR 
practices and business outcomes, though these associations may not be causative. It also 
indicates that the links between HR and the bottom line are essentially indirect, not direct and 
that evaluation is complex and problematic. In an organisation it is not possible to keep 
everything constant (eg employees, market conditions) except a new HR practice and many 
HR objectives are qualitative not quantitative. Furthermore process may be more important 
than the content and management style is an important mediating factor. As to the literature 
on the evaluation of the HR function, different quantitative and qualitative measures are 
suggested. Nevertheless, whatever measures are used, there is a subjective element, not least 
in the formulation and interpretation of the measures themselves. 
 
When it comes to the literature specifically concerned with measuring reward practices, we 
have found no recent longitudinal, before/after studies. Instead, they are cross-sectional.  
Within these limitations some themes emerge: first, the importance and complexity of linking 
reward strategies to business goals systematically; second, the different stakeholder interests; 
and third, the need to relate evaluation to the original objectives. This also implies that the 
original objectives need to be measurable. Above all, however, we note that the literature is 
mainly based on the private sector. In the public services the evaluation of pay systems is 
further complicated by the fact that there are no simple bottom line targets. Also, there are 
significant problems in measuring productivity, particularly in the NHS, although the Office 
of National Statistics and the Audit Commission are trying to do this. 
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Part II NHS trusts 
2.1 Background 
 
In the first part of our report we reviewed the literature relating to the evaluation of reward 
systems. This part of our report focuses on the evaluation of new pay and grading systems 
undertaken by 10 NHS trusts. Our previous research report (Corby et al, 2001) was a 
comprehensive account of new pay arrangements designed by NHS trusts during the 1990s 
under Conservative administrations. It covered trust aims and objectives, pay systems, pay 
progression, the process and costs of introducing new pay arrangements, evaluation and 
outcomes. Here we revisit and re-appraise our data, looking solely at the way evaluation was 
conducted. Evaluation, however, does not happen in a vacuum. Whether a pay system is 
‘effective’, depends on whether or not it achieves its stated goal(s). Accordingly, we look at 
both trust aims and objectives and at their methods of evaluation. Finally we consider whether 
changes were made as a result of the evaluation. Before doing so, however, we set out our 
research questions and briefly describe our sample and our data collection methods.  
 
2.2 The research  
 
2.2.1 Research questions 
 
Our research questions were as follows:  
 
• What were the aims and objectives of NHS trusts when introducing new pay 
arrangements? 
• What data did organisations collect and review to inform their evaluation? 
• What steps have organisations taken as a result of their evaluation? 
 
2.2.2 Sample and methods 
 
A full description of our sample and methods is given in Corby et al (2001). Here we 
concentrate on the main points. The 10 NHS trusts in our study were selected after discussion 
with the Department of Health as case studies to highlight a variety of different approaches to 
pay and grading. The sample provided rich data highlighting the themes and issues that have 
arisen in the evaluation of pay and grading innovations. It was not, however, statistically 
representative of all trusts in England; nor was it statistically representative of all trusts which 
have introduced changes in pay and grading. 
 
Table 2.1 gives the details. Very Large Acute 1 was the result of a merger in 1998 between 
two hospitals (Urban and another trust) which still had at the time of writing different pay 
systems. In this report, though, we only look at Urban, which in 1994 introduced a radical and 
comprehensive new pay system. The 10 NHS trusts in this study were situated in six out of 
the eight NHS regions in England. They provided a range of differing secondary care 
services: general acute, multi-service, teaching and specialised community and they varied in 
size as measured by the number of employees (headcount) from 1,805 to 4,557, see Table 2.1. 
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Our sample, however, did not include any ambulance trusts because the occupational groups 
covered and their industrial relations arrangements set them apart from the other NHS trusts. 
  
The trusts also varied in the type of pay system they had introduced, when they had 
introduced it and the number of employees affected. Some departed significantly from the 
national pay arrangements known as Whitley and made fundamental changes to the pay and 
grading system for all non-medical employees. Others made fundamental changes for only a 
discrete group of staff, such as those in theatres. In contrast, some made minimal changes to 
Whitley, either for a large or a small proportion of their employees. As to timing, three trusts 
(Multiservice 1, Urban, Very Large Acute) introduced radical changes to pay systems as early 
as 1994. On the other hand Acute Teaching 3 was only completing the introduction of pay 
changes in 2000. Table 2. 2 gives details. It also shows take-up rates as a percentage of 
eligible staff. This is because when staff were transferred from health authorities to the trusts, 
the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations applied. As long as 
they stayed in the same job they could remain on their old (Whitley) contracts, unless they 
chose not to do so. (Furthermore, under common law a contract can only be varied by 
agreement.)  
 
Our previous report (Corby et al, 2000) gives full details of our data collection methods. Here 
we just repeat some key points. We inspected a range of NHS trust documents including 
labour turnover data, exit interview data, collective agreements, employee attitude surveys 
and reports to the trust board. We also conducted 73 face-to-face, tape-recorded sessions. 
These included one-to-one interviews with managers, group interviews with union 
representatives and focus groups of employees. 
 
Table 2. 1 NHS trust by region and number of employees 
No. non-
medical 
employees*
 
 Trust 
 
NHS region 
Headcount 
Acute Teaching 1 
 
Trent 4,286 
Acute Teaching 2 
 
Trent 4,534 
Acute Teaching 3 
 
London 3,744 
Community 
  
South East 1,805 
Large Acute 
 
Eastern 2,151 
Multiservice 1 
 
South East 2,687 
Multiservice 2 
 
Eastern 2,361 
Multiservice 3:  
 
North West 4,557 
Urban and another trust 
with which it merged  in 
1998 
 
Trent 4,409 
Very Large Acute 
 
Northern & Yorkshire 4,419 
* September 1999 
Source:   NHS Executive, 1999. 
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Table 2. 2 Pay arrangements in NHS trusts 
NHS trust New pay arrangements Description of employees 
eligible 
Approximate 
number of 
employees 
eligible* 
Take-up* 
% 
Date of 
introduction 
Acute Teaching 1 
 
Pay & grading structure All non-medical staff except 
scientists, pharmacists, estates 
officers. 
 
4,000   25 1995
Acute Teaching 2 
 
Pay & grading structure All theatre staff 
 
200   90 1998
Acute Teaching 3 
 
Adaptation of Whitley Nurses, midwives, health 
visitors, support workers 
 
1,500 90 1996 – 2000 
Community 
  
Pay & grading structure All non-medical staff except 
grade B clinical psychologists 
 
1,750   65 1996
Large Acute Adaptation of Whitley Central Sterile Services Dept 
Maintenance craftsmen 
Clinical support workers 
Midwives 
40 
14 
250 
100 
100 
100 
90 
>65 
1993 
1997 
1999 
1999 
Multiservice 1 Pay & grading structure All non-medical staff 2,600 75-80 1994 
 
Multiservice 2 Pay & grading structure Qualified theatre staff 80 92 1997 
 
Multi-service 3 Variation of Whitley Some pathology lab staff 24 100 1998 
 
Urban**  Pay & grading structure Nurses and midwives 900 95 1994 
 
 
Very Large Acute Pay & grading structure All non-medical staff 4,000 67 1994 
 
* Number of employees as at Sep 1999; take-up rates as at summer 2000 
** Urban  (which merged with another trust in 1998) also developed pay systems for admin & clerical, hotel services, ‘professional’ staff, ODAs/ODPs 
Source: Corby et al (2000)  
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2.3 Findings 
 
2.3.1 Aims and objectives 
 
As noted in section 2.1, one must know what the pay arrangement was trying to achieve, in 
order to evaluate whether it is effective. Accordingly we have to look at trust aims and 
objectives. These can be placed in two broad categories: where trusts made relatively minor 
changes for a small proportion of staff and where trusts made major changes for a significant 
proportion of staff. See Table 2. 2 for details. 
 
Dealing with trusts which made major changes, trust aims could be broadly categorised as 
value driven. For instance, Acute Teaching 1 wanted a new pay structure which would be 
affordable, fair, easily understood and easy to apply. Community wanted a pay system that 
was simple to operate and administer and would enable managers better to manage the 
performance of staff. Multiservice 1 wanted a pay system where pay progression was based 
on performance, not service and would allow pay progression without promotion, to 
encourage staff to stay delivering hands-on care. Urban was more ambitious in its aims. As 
well as wanting a system where pay progression was based on performance and was 
affordable, it wanted to improve the quality of patient care and recognise and support new 
ways of working and professional development. Very Large Acute wanted a system that 
provided a flexible, equitable and simple approach to pay and conditions and rewarded staff 
for the performance of the trust (not the individual). From this certain common threads 
emerged: affordability, simplicity, flexibility and the reward of good performance. 
 
As opposed to these value driven aims, where trusts made changes in respect of a small group 
of staff, the aims were issue driven. Thus Multiservice 3, which varied Whitley for certain 
staff in pathology laboratories, wanted to provide a more affordable and efficient system of 24 
hour cover. Acute Teaching 2 and Multiservice 2, whose new pay arrangements centred on 
theatre staff also wanted to provide a more affordable and efficient system of 24 hour cover. 
In addition, though, they both wanted to support multi-skilling and the breaking down of 
demarcation barriers and to overcome recruitment and retention problems. As to Acute 
Teaching 3, where the new pay arrangements for nurses, midwives, health visitors and 
support workers were rolled out gradually over four years, the aims changed over time. The 
overcoming of recruitment and retention problems came to the fore, though other aims stayed 
constant: to reward competency and provide ‘headroom’ through broad banding. Large Acute 
had different aims for different occupational groups: for maintenance craftsmen and staff in 
central sterile services, the aim was better to provide 24 hour cover. For clinical support 
workers and midwives the aims were to reward competencies and provide headroom by 
introducing some broad banding. From this certain common threads emerged: the provision of 
24 hour cover, the breaking down of demarcation barriers and the overcoming of recruitment 
and retention problems. 
2.3.2 Evaluation 
 
As stated in section 2.2, staff could choose whether to move on to the trust’s new pay 
arrangements. In fact we found that only where there was a small group of employees (less 
than 40) was there 100 per cent take-up. Accordingly in all other cases, trusts had a ready-
made control group. None, however, made use of that for pay evaluation purposes. Thus all 
the trusts collected information on labour turnover, but they did not distinguish between those 
on trust pay and those on the national arrangements to ascertain whether there was an 
 16
Does it Work? Evaluating a new pay system     Part II: NHS trusts 
association between the new pay arrangements and retention. This was surprising, especially 
where an explicit aim was to overcome recruitment and retention problems as in three trusts 
(Acute Teaching 2, Acute Teaching 3, Multiservice 2). Managers, however, were of the view 
that a host of factors contributed to labour turnover and so they did not consider that they 
could usefully use such data specifically to evaluate their new pay structures. 
 
Similarly all trusts (as required by the NHS Executive) carried out a staff attitude survey. 
Indeed, some of our trusts had used staff attitude surveys for many a year, ie before the NHS 
Executive requirement. Again, though, they did not use the survey specifically to evaluate the 
pay system. Accordingly, they did not distinguish between those on trust pay and those on the 
national arrangements to ascertain whether there was an association between the new pay 
arrangements and staff views on, for instance, morale or feelings of fairness. This was 
surprising, especially where an aim was to introduce a fair/equitable pay system as in Acute 
Teaching 1 and Very Large Acute respectively.  
 
Furthermore, we found that trusts looked at paybill costs overall, comparing the costs before 
and after the introduction of the new pay arrangements for the staff group(s) concerned. None 
of the trusts, however, compared the paybill costs of those on trust pay with the paybill costs 
of those not on trust pay, even though affordability was an explicit aim of five trusts and five 
trusts also altered the unsocial hours, overtime and on-call premia of staff under the new pay 
arrangements. 
 
Indeed in one trust (Acute Teaching 1), the new pay system was rolled out gradually to 
provide ‘the opportunity to closely monitor small and manageable segments of the 
organisation enabling swift corrective action to be taken when seen to be necessary’, as the 
HR director said in his original briefing to the board. In the event, however, no evaluation of 
the impact of the new pay system was undertaken at that trust. 
   
A few trusts, however, conducted some limited evaluation as a one-off exercise, centring on 
one aspect of the new pay arrangements. They relied on self-report and there was no attempt 
to consider whether the respondents were representative of the workforce as a whole. Thus 
Acute Teaching 3, which was introducing new pay arrangements for nurses and which was 
particularly concerned with recruitment conducted an evaluation in 1997 shortly after the new 
arrangements were first being introduced, issuing a questionnaire. For instance, staff were 
asked if the new arrangements would positively influence their decision to apply for a post. 
(A minority said that they would.) This, however, was small scale (only 40 respondents) and 
as the HR director admitted ‘we were not evaluating in the sense of setting it against costed 
alternatives’. Another one-off exercise was carried out at Multiservice 2 by a member of the 
HR department. This took the form of a report looking at the extent that multi-skilling had 
occurred in theatres (a trust aim) one year after the introduction of the new pay system for 
qualified staff. (It found that the desired flexibility had not yet been achieved.) In addition, 
Community carried out a small scale one-off exercise in 1999, looking at the performance 
development review (PDR) process in respect of community nurses. This indicated that 
community nurses felt that pay progression depended on the person who conducted the PDR, 
rather than on the performance of the employee.  
 
In contrast to these relatively limited internal evaluations, Urban carried out an extensive 
evaluation of its performance pay system in 1997, after it had been in operation for over two 
years. Using self-report, data was obtained from a range of sources including a questionnaire 
survey (response rate = 20 per cent), individual interviews and focus groups. As Urban’s aims 
were to provide a pay system which improved the quality of patient care and supported new 
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ways of working and professional development, its questionnaire addressed those issues, 
along with issues around staff motivation and staff perceptions of fairness. It found that there 
was overall agreement that there had been a positive impact on patient care, on professional 
development (both original objectives) and on staff motivation though the margin of 
difference between the positive and negative views expressed was not large and again there 
was no control group. In addition the trust conducted an analysis of performance awards to 
see if there was any bias. It found none from an equal opportunities perspective, but evidence 
of bias according to sub-group, see below in section 2.4. 
 
Table 2. 3 One-off evaluation exercises 
 Trust 
 
Internal External 
 Type 
 
Date Type Date 
Acute Teaching 1 
 
    
Acute Teaching 2 
 
Reports to the board from 
the HR director 
1998 Small-scale study by 
MBA student 
focusing on staff 
attitudes 
1999 
Acute Teaching 3 
 
Small scale survey 
focussing on recruitment & 
retention 
1997   
Community 
  
Small scale audit of 
performance development 
& review  among 
community nurses 
1999   
Large Acute 
 
    
Multiservice 1 
 
Small-scale survey of 
process 
1995 Large scale survey to 
determine whether 
performance pay a 
motivator 
1996 
Multiservice 2 
 
Review focussing on 
multi-skilling 
1998   
Multiservice 3:  
 
    
Urban Large scale survey: 
questionnaires, interviews 
& focus groups 
1997   
Very Large Acute Survey concentrating on 
process 
1995 Large scale survey to 
determine whether 
performance pay a 
motivator 
1996 
Source: Corby et al, 2001 
 
 
These evaluation exercises were carried out internally. In three trusts there was a combination 
of internal and external evaluation. At Multiservice 1 in 1995, one year after the start of the 
scheme, there was a small scale internal survey of the individual performance pay process 
(not outcomes) with responses from 42 staff. The trust found that the system was operating 
fairly well. The trust did not at any time, however, attempt to look at the length of time in 
grade, although one of its aims was to encourage staff to stay delivering hands-on care by 
allowing pay progression without promotion. In addition to Multiservice 1’s internal survey, 
in 1996 there was a much wider survey by academics. There were 691 usable responses to a 
one-off questionnaire, a 30 per cent response rate. A majority of staff, 62 per cent, thought 
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that performance-related pay was good in principle but a majority did not think that the 
performance pay system had given them an incentive to work beyond the requirements of 
their job or made them more sensitive to the needs of patients. This was part of a larger study 
looking at whether performance pay was a motivator in the public services and the trust did 
not commission the study. The academics took the initiative in approaching the trust for 
access. 
 
This same study (Marsden and French, 1998) also prompted by the academics themselves, not 
commissioned by the trust, covered Very Large Acute in 1996, which operated a performance 
pay system based on the performance of the trust, not the individual. There were 914 
responses, a response rate of 22 per cent. A majority, 52 per cent, thought that the 
performance pay system was good in principle but a majority did not think that it had given 
them an incentive to work beyond the requirements of their job or made them more sensitive 
to the needs of patients. This external evaluation was preceded by a smaller scale internal 
evaluation by Very Large Acute in mid-1995, 18 months after its pay system had been 
introduced, concentrating on process, rather than outcome. 
 
The third trust in our sample to combine internal and external evaluation was Acute Teaching 
2, where the new pay arrangements applied only to staff in theatres, not to all non-medical 
staff, unlike the other two trusts which combined internal and external evaluation. The 
external evaluation was conducted by an MBA student (Kitching, 1999), who made the initial 
approach to the trust. He interviewed 18 theatre staff to ascertain their attitudes. (He found 
that staff were more orientated to personal development; there had been an increase in staff 
autonomy but morale remained variable). The internal evaluation took the form of reports to 
the board in 1998 less than a year after introduction detailing the costs involved in the 
development of the pay system and evaluating the pay bill costs. One of these reports also 
claimed that there was more efficient rostering and reduced expenditure on overtime as a 
result of the new pay system, but the data on which these claims were based were not given to 
the researchers nor, we understand, to the board. Table 2.3 summarises the one-off evaluation 
exercises conducted by the 10 NHS trusts studied. 
 
2.4 Further steps  
 
As a result of this limited evaluation very few further steps were taken. The main exception 
was Urban where the performance pay system was slightly changed. Performance pay was 
awarded in 0.5 per cent steps, instead of 2 per cent steps as before to allow for more finely 
differentiated progression and the quota was applied on a sub-group basis, not a wider job 
family basis as before.  
 
Another relatively minor change was made at Very Large Acute, but this was essentially 
because of representations by the unions, not as a result of evaluation. In short, the 
performance award system was modified so that absences on account of pregnancy, 
bereavement and occupationally induced sickness would no longer be counted towards the 
withholding of an award and a panel was set up to make a decision on whether an award 
should be withheld from an individual to ensure greater consistency between 
departments/directorates. 
 
Otherwise few changes were made, even though the external evaluation at two trusts indicated 
that the performance pay system was not a motivator. This, however, was because of 
anticipated political changes from 1996 and then actual political changes. In May 1997 a 
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Labour government took office with a policy of national pay with some local flexibility, 
replacing the Conservative government’s support for trust pay systems. Accordingly the trusts 
in our sample which had all implemented some innovations in pay and grading, essentially 
decided to wait and see what emerged as a result of consultation and negotiation nationally.  
 
2.5 Summary 
 
This part of the report is based on the new pay arrangements introduced by 10 NHS trusts in 
England during the 1990s. Trust aims varied but there were certain common threads: 
affordability, simplicity, flexibility, the reward of good performance and the overcoming of 
recruitment and retention problems. Despite these explicit and often wide-ranging aims, 
evaluation of the new pay arrangements was on the whole limited. Although trusts collected 
much HR information, for instance labour turnover statistics, and carried out staff attitude 
surveys, they did not use the data to evaluate their pay systems or make use of a control group 
(ie staff who had not moved on to the new pay system). Some trusts, however, conducted 
certain one-off exercises to evaluate a specific aspect of their new pay arrangements, but in no 
trust was there a longitudinal exercise. In two trusts the performance pay system was 
evaluated by a university, but the academics approached these trusts for access. The trusts did 
not commission the academics. In a further trust a student evaluated the new theatre pay 
system for his MBA dissertation. 
 
Finally, two trusts made marginal changes to their pay systems. In one trust (Urban) this 
stemmed from the trust’s evaluation. In the other trust it was essentially the result of 
representations by the unions.  
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Part III: Organisations outside the NHS 
3. 1 Introduction 
 
The first part of our report was a review of the literature on the evaluation of pay systems to 
identify themes and issues. Part II of our report dealt with the evaluation of new pay systems 
by NHS trusts. This third part of the report is concerned with how organisations outside the 
NHS, which have introduced new pay arrangements, conducted their evaluation.  
 
As explained in the second part of this report, when conducting our research on the pay 
systems introduced by 10 NHS trusts in the 1990s under the Conservative government’s 
arrangements, we found that little rigorous evaluation had been undertaken by the NHS trusts 
themselves. Against this background, we looked at organisations outside the NHS to see what 
evaluation they had carried out. Were NHS trusts unusual in not conducting any rigorous 
evaluation? What evaluation of pay systems did other organisations carry out? 
 
Our findings are presented under the following headings: 
 
• Aims and objectives 
• Evaluation  
• Further steps 
 
These thematic headings are used to organise the data and our analysis intentionally draws 
selectively from our data to illustrate points being discussed. The tables, however, list all 
seven organisations, but only capture key points. A more comprehensive account of our 
findings in each organisation is given in the annex.  
 
3.2 The research 
3.2.1 The research questions 
 
The research questions used for this part of the study were the same as those used in part II 
but for completeness, we repeat our research questions as follows: 
 
• What were the aims and objectives of organisations when introducing new pay 
arrangements? 
 
• What data did organisations collect and review to inform their evaluation? 
  
• What steps have organisations taken as a result of their evaluation? 
 
3.2.2 Sample and methods  
 
We discuss here both the organisations selected and the method of data collection. Adopting a 
case study approach, we sought, as far as possible, to identify organisations which were 
similar to the NHS in structure and in industrial relations. So we looked for multi-site, 
unionised organisations. Also, given that our interest was in the evaluation of pay systems we 
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sought organisations which had introduced new pay arrangements in the last few years. Using 
IDS Reports, together with contacts obtained, for instance, through the Cabinet Office, we 
identified seven organisations. This sample is not statistically representative of all the 
organisations in England that have implemented changes in pay and grading. Nor was it 
intended to be. The main purpose of this part of our research was to capture the rationales for 
evaluation, the way evaluation was conducted, the constraints and the outcomes in some 
detail.  
 
Some of the organisations wanted anonymity, so in such cases a pseudonym has been used. 
Of our seven organisations, four were in the public sector and three in the private sector. 
Although all were multi-site and unionised, they varied in size as measured by the number of 
employees. The smallest in terms of number of employees (headcount) was Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) with 4,500 employees, and the largest was Royal 
Mail with some 160,000 employees. Furthermore they varied in function as the names or 
pseudonyms, make clear. For instance the three private sector organisations were engaged in 
different activities: engineering, communications and insurance. Table 3. 1 gives details as 
well as showing the abbreviations which we have used in the text. 
 
Table 3. 1 Organisation by number of employees 
Name of organisation Name used 
in text 
Number of 
employees 
Assureco Assureco    4,700 
BAE Systems BAE Systems  *55,500 
County Council Council  24,854 
Government Communications 
Headquarters 
GCHQ    4,500 
HM Customs & Excise C & E  22,000 
Royal Mail RM 160,000 
Telecomco Telecomco *117,000 
* UK only; BAE Systems has 100,000 world-wide and Telecomco has 137,00 world-wide 
Source:  Annual reports for Assureco, BAE Systems, Consignia, Telecomco.  
Information from websites for Council and C & E and from interview at GCHQ. 
 
Inevitably given their different size, functions and context, these organisations varied in the 
type of new pay arrangements they had introduced and the numbers and proportion of staff 
affected. For instance the new pay arrangements at HM Customs & Excise (C & E) consisted 
of a narrowly focused team bonus system which affected only some 700 staff (3 per cent). 
BAE Systems and C & E apart, the pay changes affected well over half the employees in all 
the other organisations in our sample. Also in all the organisations except C & E the changes 
included new pay and grading systems and were thus more wide ranging. The most complex 
was the Way Forward package at Royal Mail which comprised eight separate agreements on 
employment security, pay and grading, shorter working week, annual leave, meal breaks, way 
of working, working time regulations and deployment and affected 150,000 staff.   
 
It should be noted that in two of our organisations the framework for the pay arrangements 
had been established outside the organisation. Thus the Council was implementing the 
framework local government agreement of 1997 and C & E were implementing the 
framework advanced in the Makinson report (2000). Our other five organisations were free to 
devise their own frameworks, though GCHQ’s framework had to be approved by its parent 
department (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and HM Treasury. The dates of introduction 
also varied: the most recent was Assureco in February 2001. The most long standing was 
GCHQ’s pay system. Full details are given in Table 3. 2. 
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As to the documents used, we drew on secondary sources, particularly IDS Report and IRS 
Employment Trends.  The primary source documents on which we drew varied greatly. This 
was because the organisations differed markedly in the pay arrangements that they had 
introduced as we have noted. In all the organisations, however, there were briefing documents 
and/or leaflets explaining the new arrangements to staff. Typically, the annual report informed 
the context and in GCHQ, where there are special constraints for national security reasons, we 
were given only unclassified documents. The documents used are listed in our references, 
located at the back of this report. 
 
Table 3. 2 Pay arrangements by organisation 
 
Organisation Pay arrangements Number  & description of 
employees covered 
Date of 
introduction 
Assureco Pay, grading and 
performance system 
 
4,500  front-line, professional and 
managerial staff 
February 2001 
 BAE 
Systems 
Pay and job evaluated 
grading structure 
 
Some 6,500 professional, technical 
and administrative staff in seven 
sites 
 
June 1997-December 1998 
C & E Team bonuses 
 
700 employees in 6 sites July 2000 
Council Harmonised, job evaluated 
pay system 
22,000 – all staff covered by 
National Joint Council terms & 
conditions 
 
April 2000 
GCHQ Pay and grading system 4,470 – all staff except those in the   
senior civil service 
April 1996 
Royal Mail Pay, grading, working time 
and working practices 
package 
 
150,000 employees in postal and 
postal support grades 
February 2000 
Telecomco Pay & grading system and 
conditions 
 
80,000 non-managerial employees October, 2000 
 
. 
Bearing in mind that in our literature review we had identified that there could be different 
perspectives in an organisation (Thorpe et al, 2000: 251), we obtained two perspectives on the 
evaluation process: a managerial and a union perspective. These were generally obtained by 
face-to-face interviews, but four interviewees were only prepared to be interviewed by 
telephone, although the researchers’ preference for a face-to-face interview had been clearly 
stated. In addition one interview was conducted by way of a video conference. Details of the 
interviews are shown in Table 3.3. In RM where the national agreement provides the scope 
for different workplace approaches, we were of the view that it would have been useful to 
interview local managers. We were, however, denied access, essentially because of the 
sensitive situation. See sub-section 3.3.2.3.  
 
The interviews we conducted in our case study organisations were supplemented by an 
interview at the Cabinet Office, which gave us an overview in respect of the two civil service 
departments in our sample (C & E and GCHQ) and consultation with the editor of IDS 
Report. Also as the Council was implementing a national agreement, there was an additional 
interview with a representative of the Employers’ Organisation for local government, as well 
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as attendance at a conference on the implementation of the local government framework 
agreement where a spokesperson from the Council made a presentation about their new pay 
system. 
 
Table 3. 3 Interviews conducted 
Organisation Management Union 
Assureco Training Manager Full-time official** 
 
C & E Two management respondents at one 
interview session 
Full-time  official 
Council HR manager** Union representative** 
 
 BAE 
Systems 
HR manager Union representative•
GCHQ HR manager Chair of  Government 
Communications Group* 
 
Royal Mail HR manager  Union research officer 
 
Telecomco HR manager** Union research officer 
 
*    Informal discussion only 
** Telephone interview 
•      Video-conference 
 
 
3.3 The findings 
 
This part of our report presents our findings under three main headings: aims and objectives, 
the data collected for evaluation and the actions taken as a result of evaluation. 
3.3.1 Aims and objectives 
 
This sub-section addresses our first research question: the aims and objectives of 
organisations when introducing new pay arrangements.  The introduction of new pay systems 
in unionised organisations involves management and unions, (although the degree of union 
involvement in the design varies) and the aims and objectives of the new pay arrangements 
are normally set out explicitly.  As noted in sub-section 3.2.2 in our sample they varied 
between the complex, eg Royal Mail with its eight agreements comprising the Way Forward 
package, and the simple, eg the team bonus trial at C & E. Especially where there were many 
aims and objectives, the priority attached to them by the parties sometimes varied.  
 
Thus at Assureco the aims were listed as follows: 
 
• to reward individual performance instead of teams;  
• to attract and retain the right people at an affordable cost; 
• to provide a pay system which staff would find fair. 
 
Assureco’s objectives were to: 
 
 reduce staff turnover, particularly of junior and front-line staff, by ensuring staff were paid 
a competitive rate for the job; 
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 increase performance and motivation; 
 get managers to manage people rather than work targets.  
 
Thus a key management objective was to reduce labour turnover among junior and front-line 
staff and this objective was shared by the union; but the priority attached by management and 
the union to other aims and objectives varied. Whereas a managerial priority was to reward 
the performance of individuals, not teams, a union priority was to reduce staffs’ feelings of 
unfairness in respect of the pay and grading system.  
 
This difference in priorities could also be seen at Royal Mail. The aims and objectives were 
set out often in great detail for each of the eight agreements comprising the Way Forward 
package, see annex (section A.6) for full details. Yet our interview with a manager revealed 
that management’s main aim was to improve efficiency. This involved other aims, such as 
creating a single operational grade to foster flexibility and developing the capability for the 
speedy and successful introduction of change. Our union interviewee’s main aim, however, 
was to improve the basic pay of members and to improve working conditions by reducing the 
dependence on overtime.  
 
Similarly, at Telecomco there was a difference in priorities. The main aims of both 
management and the union were to: 
 
• create an integrated pay and grading structure; 
• introduce common terms and conditions for all non-management employees; and  
• establish an ‘open culture’ in learning and development. 
 
Management saw this as leading to more flexibility: new jobs created in the context of rapid 
technological change could be easily graded and barriers to the movement of staff reduced 
because of harmonisation. The union wanted to improve the terms and conditions of its 
members. Furthermore, a major issue for management was cost, while a major issue for the 
union was the maintenance of national bargaining.   
 
Table 3. 4  Main aims of new pay arrangements 
Organisation Management aims Union aims 
Assureco Reduce labour turnover. 
Reward individual performance. 
Reduce labour turnover. 
Ensure staff regard the pay system as fair. 
 
BAE Systems Harmonise and simplify the pay structure. 
Retain staff. 
Discourage ‘grade ‘chasing. 
 
Enhance the terms and conditions of 
members. 
C & E Ascertain whether team bonuses incentivise staff. Ascertain whether team bonuses incentivise 
staff. 
 
Council Provide equal pay for work of equal value. 
 
Provide equal pay for work of equal value. 
GCHQ Attract and retain those with scare skills. 
 
Attract and retain those with scarce skills. 
Royal Mail Provide flexibility. 
Encourage new working practices. 
 
Improve basic pay. 
Reduce hours of work. 
Telecomco Provide flexibility. 
 
Enhance the terms and conditions of 
members. 
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At BAE Systems the stated aims of the new pay arrangements were: 
 
• to be self financing through efficiency gains; 
• to harmonise the disparate agreements across seven sites; 
• to simplify the grade structure and make it more transparent; 
• to bring salaries up to the market rate and improve retention; 
• to allow for progression within grades; 
• to move to a project based as opposed to a function based approach. 
 
Among these six aims the unions gave priority to simplification and transparency and 
management to progression within grades. 
 
In some cases, however, the main aims of both management and the union coincided. Both 
the local government Employers’ Organisation and the Council identified the objectives of 
their ‘single status’ agreement as providing equal pay for work of equal value and providing 
fair pay and equal treatment of staff, irrespective of whether such staff were manual or non-
manual, by harmonisation and the ironing out of anomalies. Indeed, Council which had 
already had a costly equal value dispute (see annex, section A.3) was particularly anxious to 
introduce an equal value proof scheme. The union, Unison, shared the Council’s aims. At C & 
E, management and union shared the same aim of having an unbiased trial of the team bonus 
system. At GCHQ, the establishment of a pay structure with ‘job pay group families’ (ie 
functional groups such as information scientists, linguists) aimed both to enable GCHQ to 
attract and retain skilled people and to enable the union to improve the pay of its members. 
Second, GCHQ wanted its pay system to reward individual performance in a way that 
employees perceived as fair – again a shared management/union aim, though perhaps the 
management’s emphasis was on rewarding performance and the union’s emphasis was on 
fairness. 
 
As we have noted, the documents often listed many aims without priority and the annex gives 
full details. Table 3. 4 merely sets out the main aims, generally teased out from our 
interviewees. 
 
3.3.2 Evaluation 
 
This sub-section addresses our second research question: the data collected to inform 
evaluation. As already stated, evaluation does not occur in a vacuum but is conducted in the 
context of the aims and objectives of the pay system. We deal first with the data collected by 
management and then the data collected by the union.  
3.3.2.1 Evaluation by managers 
 
The evaluation of the pay arrangements undertaken by managers was closely related to the 
organisation’s aims. Thus at GCHQ, the main concern of management has been to ensure the 
recruitment and retention of staff, particularly those with specialist skills. Accordingly, it 
closely analysed labour turnover figures and ensured that its pay levels were competitive by 
monitoring the pay ranges allocated to specific job families and relating them to the pay rates 
offered by its labour market competitors. It also used exit interview data to evaluate its pay 
system. A personnel officer conducts the exit interview with the leaver and there is a pro-
forma to be completed by the interviewer at the time of the interview. Data from the exit 
interviews are consolidated every month and analysed every year.  GCHQ collects a range of 
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human resources (HR) data, eg on absenteeism, paybill costs and numbers of employees 
broken down by business unit and job family. As GCHQ’s main concern is recruitment and 
retention, however, not other matters, it has not used this other HR data specifically to 
evaluate the pay system. It has also not used its staff attitude survey specifically to evaluate 
the pay system, although one of the aims of its pay system is to reward individual 
performance in a way that employees perceived as fair. (The staff attitude survey only 
contains three questions on pay out of over 100 questions.)  
 
At Assureco the company aims to attract and retain staff so it is evaluating the pay system by 
monitoring labour turnover data. It also plans to use an outside agency on a one-off basis to 
conduct exit interviews with departing employees to ascertain whether the reasons given to 
the organisation for leaving are the real reasons. This is because it considers that an agency 
will provide a safe and anonymous environment for honest feedback, eliminating an 
employee's worry of jeopardising future references. Also as the company wants the new pay 
system to be seen by employees as fair, it is using the annual employee attitude survey, which 
usually has response rate of around 85 per cent. Interestingly, although affordability was one 
of its aims, the company is not using paybill information for evaluating its new pay system, 
although the HR department collects such information. Another management aim at Assureco 
was to reward individual performance. Although data are being collected on the spread of 
performance awards, data on productivity/performance are not being collected. 
 
At three of our organisations (BAE Systems, the Council, and Telecomco) the data collected 
specifically for evaluating the pay system were more limited than at GCHQ and Assureco. At 
Telecomco, the company regularly collects data on paybill costs, employee turnover, absence 
rates and employee attitudes, but has not used such data for pay system evaluation. Indeed, we 
were told that a company-wide evaluation of the new pay structure was not appropriate. The 
costs, eg as a result of the reduction in hours, varied from business to business depending on 
their staff composition, as did the savings, eg the flexibility to deploy people and the simpler 
administration resulting from the common terms and conditions. Also, according to our 
interviewee, there had been no symptom of any problems, such as industrial action or 
grievances brought by the union.  
 
In local government too, there has been virtually no evaluation. Our interviewee from the 
local government Employers’ Association commented that the objectives of the ‘single status’ 
framework agreement were so general that it was difficult to see how they could be evaluated 
rigorously. The Employers’ Association had conducted some evaluation of costs and, in 
addition, had undertaken an annual survey of local authorities on the progress made on 
implementation but there had been a low response rate: less than half the local authorities had 
responded. Only three large local authorities had introduced new grading structures, including 
our case study Council. Like the Employers’ Association nationally, our case study Council 
had undertaken virtually no evaluation of the pay system, apart from monitoring the 
assimilation costs. Our management interviewee at Council argued that the new job evaluated 
pay structure had, to the Council’s knowledge, provided equal value and that had been their 
main concern. This, however, applies only to basic pay and ignores the equal value aspects of 
other elements of earnings, such as allowances, bonuses and premia. According to the House 
of Lords in the leading case of Hayward v Cammell Laird Shipbuilders (1988) each 
contractual term has to be assessed separately in respect of equal value. 
  
At BAE Systems too, only a little, rather piecemeal evaluation has been undertaken. The 
company has a six grade structure with each grade split into three zones: development zone, 
progression zone and enhanced zone. The company tracks the numbers of staff in each of the 
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three zones of each grade and this throws light on one of the aims of the pay system: to allow 
pay progression within grades. In addition, the annual employee survey includes attitudinal 
questions relating to careers and reward and line managers can informally feed back their 
concerns. In fact, problems had not been revealed and the manager interviewed considered 
that the new pay structure was  ‘fundamentally sound’. Although the company collects 
information on employee turnover and absence rates and monitors employee costs, it does not 
use such data to evaluate the pay system. This is perhaps surprising as one of the aims of the 
pay arrangements was to improve retention and another was to ensure that the new pay 
arrangements were self-financing through efficiency gains. 
 
In contrast to BAE Systems, the Council and Telecomco, where there was little evaluation of 
the pay system, C & E carried out extensive evaluation of its team bonus system. First C & E 
employed an external consultant to carry out staff attitude surveys both in July 2000, when the 
trial started to provide a benchmark, and in June 2001, at the end of the trial and after the staff 
had received their bonus payments. These staff attitude surveys were conducted not only in 
the six trial sites but also in three control sites. In addition, the two person project team 
conducted three focus groups in each of the six sites: one for clerical/junior grades, one for 
middle managers and one for senior managers, ie 18 in all. A second element of the 
evaluation related to financial performance. This was measured after establishing a baseline 
for the trial sites and three ‘blind’ control sites. Other elements included a customer 
satisfaction survey, carried out by one of the six sites at the beginning and end of the trial 
period, and all the sites used their own local audit teams to carry out quality assurance. 
Information was also sought from the trial site managers about complaint rates, staff turnover, 
sick leave, and whether or not there was increased pressure by some team members on 
colleagues whom they (rightly or wrongly) saw as not pulling their weight.  
 
As to Royal Mail (RM), it planned to evaluate the complex eight agreement package entitled 
Way Forward mainly through joint management/union reviews. Thus the way of working 
agreement says: 
 
There will be formal joint reviews of progress at key agreed milestone dates during and after 
implementation. These will assess progress against the aims of the agreement, take appropriate 
corrective action and identify good practice (CWU, 2000a: 33). 
  
Similarly, the working time regulation agreement provides for formal joint review meetings in 
April each year. In the same vein the pay and grading agreement provides that ‘to protect both 
the value of the new package to employees and Royal Mail’s financial position, the actual 
effect of these changes will be reviewed nearer or just after implementation’ (CWU, 
2000a:12). Finally the deployment agreement says that ‘both parties agree that progress will 
be regularly monitored at all levels… In addition there will be a formal review of progress at 
national level. This will happen monthly’ (CWU, 2000a:47).  
 
Royal Mail’s joint reviews are supported by a range of data collected by the company and 
shared with the union. Thus the organisation monitors paybill costs and collects data on all the 
different elements of earnings, for instance on average basic pay, average shift payments,  
average overtime payments, average performance bonus system payments and average hours 
worked, broken down for full-time and part-time operational grades and operational support 
grades and by location. Furthermore, there is a regular print-out of all those who are working 
over a given number of hours for several weeks and frequent reports from local managers to 
RM headquarters on progress on restructuring working patterns.  
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Table 3. 5 Evaluation tools used specifically in respect of new pay arrangements 
Organisation Assimi-
lation 
costs 
Attitude 
survey 
Customer 
satisfaction 
Exit 
interviews 
Focus 
Groups 
Hours 
worked 
Labour 
turnover 
Make up 
of 
earnings 
Paybill 
costs 
Productivity 
&/or 
Performance 
Tracking 
staff by 
place on 
grade 
Assureco  √  √*       √ 
 BAE Systems  √         √ 
C & E**  √ √  √     √  
Council √           
GCHQ          √ √ 
Royal Mail      √  √ √ √  
Telecomco*** √          √ 
 
*      Assureco plans to carry out exit interviews using an external agency as a one-off exercise. 
**    C & E used control sites both in respect of data on employee attitudes and performance. 
*** Telecomco’s evaluation was carried out by businesses and not on an organisation-wide basis. Accordingly some businesses may have carried out more evaluation     
than shown in the Table, but the researchers were not given any details. 
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In addition, RM collects other information which is shared with the union but has not been 
specifically used to evaluate the pay system: the results of the annual staff attitude survey and 
the customer satisfaction surveys, overall measures of the time taken between the posting of 
letters and delivery, monthly labour turnover figures and data on sickness absences.   
The annex gives full details of the case study organisations. Table 3.5 only covers the 
tools/data specifically used for the evaluation of the pay arrangements, but in all the 
organisations studied, human resources collect much information that is used for other 
purposes, as we have indicated. Interestingly, only C & E used a customer satisfaction survey 
to evaluate the impact of its pay arrangements and then only in one of its six trial sites. 
 
3.3.2.2 Evaluation by unions 
 
Management has carried out the main thrust of evaluation. Unions are normally made aware 
of their members’ views, for instance through grievances or through views expressed at 
meetings and the unions’ main concern has been to see that members received their correct 
pay and grading. Accordingly, they often did not feel any need for additional evaluation.  
 
Thus at Telecomco, the Communication Workers Union said that its objectives had been 
achieved: 
 
We have got a non-hierarchical, more simple, unified structure; a common set of terms and conditions; 
a reduction in the working week; pay and pensions protection; and a learning and development 
statement. We know all those have happened.  
 
Similarly at the Council, Unison did not feel the need to carry out its own evaluation. It 
wanted to eradicate equal value problems, was of the view that the new job evaluation system 
was likely to have eradicated such problems and that the on-going role of a job evaluation 
analyst to look at new or changed jobs would ensure that equal value problems would not 
occur in the future. At BAE Systems, too, the unions did not conduct their own evaluation. 
 
In some of the organisations we studied, however, the union did undertake its own evaluation. 
Thus at C & E the Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS) convened two meetings of 
PCS representatives from the six trial sites to ‘deal with issues and difficulties that have arisen 
during the trials and to identify any general problems that require central intervention and 
negotiations’ and kept in touch with representatives by email (Duggan, undated). According 
to the union official interviewed, ‘we had very few, very few indeed, problems’. 
 
At GCHQ the Government Communications Group (ie the union) has relied on feedback from 
members through small group meetings. Additionally, it carried out a pay survey of all its 
members, though with hindsight, according to a union interviewee, it realised that many of the 
questions had been badly designed. So that survey proved in practice to be of only limited 
use. At Assureco, Unifi has had concerns about the system of awarding performance pay, 
according to an interviewee, mainly as a result of feedback from members. Accordingly at the 
time of the field-work (September 2001) it was planning to evaluate ‘the quality and 
timeliness’ of the appraisal process sometime during the next twelve months through a request 
to members via a newsletter. 
 
At RM management collects extensive information, see above, and according to a union 
interviewee not only shares it regularly with the union but also supplements it with frequent 
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discussion. In addition, the so-called indoor secretary, dealing with staff in mail centres, and 
the outdoor secretary, dealing with delivery staff, are ‘constantly in contact’ with divisional 
representatives who monitor progress. Until recently, however, the union has been reacting to 
problems brought to light by members and/or their representatives, but it is now taking a 
proactive stance and visiting workplaces to talk to members and examine their pay. A 
particular and on-going concern for the union has been the monitoring of overall earnings and 
basic pay as a proportion of total pay and this is being done by the union’s research 
department to inform future pay negotiations.  
 
3.3.2.3 Problems in evaluation 
 
There were a number of problems experienced by managers when trying to evaluate the pay 
system. First, the new pay system was often being introduced at a time of widespread change 
and it was not possible to disentangle the effects of pay changes from the effects of other 
changes. For instance at C & E the team bonus trial coincided with departmental 
restructuring, new appointment, promotion and appraisal systems and the advent of a new 
chairman who spoke to all managers (grade 7 and above) about what he expected from them. 
According to an interviewee, many trial site managers told the project team that they were 
now managing ‘perhaps in a way that we ought to have been for years’. For instance they said 
that they were now involving staff monthly in information and discussion about the team’s 
progress towards the achievement of targets ‘which hadn’t happened before’ and the focus 
groups of staff confirmed this. The project team, however, were unable to establish the extent 
to which the chairman’s intervention, as opposed to the team bonus system, had been the 
determining factor. As an interviewee put it: there was a lot of ‘noise’ in the organisation.  
 
Similarly at Assureco significant changes in organisational structure and practice and the 
outsourcing of new technology occurred at the same time as the new structure was being 
implemented. There was also organisational restructuring at BAE Systems and Telecomco, 
which allied with changeable market conditions, meant that the stability necessary for a 
rigorous evaluation was lacking. At RM, although employee costs exceeded budget by £33 
million (in the context of a paybill of £3.5 billion), the accountants were not able to pinpoint 
the costs solely arising from The Way Forward package because other things had ‘been going 
on’, according to an interviewee. 
 
A second complication stems from the evaluation process itself. Even if it is possible to show 
that there is an association, eg the new pay arrangements lead to an improvement in employee 
morale, this does not equate to a causal connection. Furthermore, two interviewees remarked 
that the connection between a new pay arrangement and better performance, leading to 
increased customer satisfaction or improved profitability or productivity, was tenuous. For 
instance the HR manager at Telecomco was of the view that the new pay system would 
contribute to a change in the culture of the organisation. She said that should translate into 
improved productivity, though the link was not easily measurable and changing culture was a 
slow process. A similar proposition, however, arguably applies to other factors. Pay systems 
can support, for instance, new working practices which in turn lead to better performance, but 
their impact is indirect, not direct, as another interviewee remarked. 
 
A third complication was that changes in pay arrangements were generally accompanied by 
changes in pay levels. As a result if a major aim of the pay structure was to recruit and retain, 
as it was for instance at Assureco, BAE Systems, GCHQ, and Telecomco, then the 
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achievement of that aim might rest as much on improved pay levels as on an improved pay 
structure and it was difficult to separate out these two intertwining elements.  
 
There was a particular problem at RM stemming from the implementation of The Way 
Forward package which has interfered with the programme of joint management/union 
reviews to be held as part of the evaluation process. The Way Forward agreements require 
change to be deployed throughout mail centres and delivery offices through detailed, 
negotiated revisions to working arrangements; but in September 2001, ie after an elapse of 
almost 18 months, The Way Forward package had ‘yet to come into force in more than a third 
of the 870 delivery offices, including 104 in London’ (Brown, 2001a:9). According to a CWU 
official interviewed, problems of implementation partly stemmed from the fact that RM sent 
out numerous directives to local managers explaining The Way Forward deal and how it 
should be implemented, without allowing time for the union to go through the draft directives 
and highlight its concerns. This led to differences at workplaces between management and the 
union on interpretation and national union officials had spent their time fire-fighting local 
disputes. The same union official also pointed out that the performance bonus system had 
proved contentious. Whatever the reasons for slow implementation, and fuller details are 
given in the annex (section A.6), there has been a rise in industrial action, mainly unofficial, 
none of it nation-wide, mostly triggered by the conduct code and the attendance procedures, 
but partly triggered by Way Forward disputes (Sawyer et al, 2001). 
 
A further problem related to time-scale. Where the evaluation exercise was time limited, the 
information obtainable was only able to shed light on the immediate, not the longer term. For 
instance at C & E, as noted above in sub-section 3.3.2.1, information was sought from 
managers in the trial bonus sites about complaint rates, staff turnover and sick leave. 
According to the project leader, however, this data was of limited use because the trial was 
conducted for only a short time (less than nine months). Other data too, such as that obtained 
from the staff attitude surveys, also covered a very short time period. Another problem at C & 
E arose from the fact that the performance targets were exceeded both in the trial sites and the 
control sites and all the trial teams met all their targets. This severely limited the effectiveness 
of the evaluation. 
 
3.3.3 Further steps 
 
Our third research question centred on the steps organisations have taken as a result of their 
evaluation. In other words, what has been the outcome of any evaluation? Two of the 
organisations we studied were still in the process of implementing their new pay arrangements 
and thus regarded it as premature to make changes. Assureco introduced new pay 
arrangements in February 2001 and so only six months had elapsed between this introduction 
and our field-work. Moreover, Assureco’s new pay structure includes an individual 
performance pay system for supervisors and middle managers whereby an employee is 
positioned on a so-called anchor point, but the anchor point depends on both performance and 
potential. Yet at the time of our field-work these staff had yet to be appraised and placed on 
anchor points. Although the company carries out annual staff attitude surveys, which it 
intends to use for pay evaluation purposes, it had not yet carried out such a survey since the 
new pay system had been introduced. Thus it was not yet in a position even to contemplate 
changes as it had yet to find out whether staff thought the new pay system fairer than their old 
one or whether they felt more motivated. A similar situation applied at RM too: because of 
problems of implementation, see sub-section 3.3.2.3 above, The Way Forward package had 
yet to be introduced in all the workplaces.  
 32
Does it Work? Evaluating a  new pay system     Part III: Organisations outside the NHS 
Two other organisations had completed the implementation of their new pay systems, but they 
had done this relatively recently. Thus both the Council and Telecomco had introduced their 
new pay systems in 2000.  At BAE Systems, where the pay system was nearly four years old 
at the time of the field-work, there was little evaluation but managers were not planning any 
changes, as no real problems had been reported.  
 
GCHQ, however, which had introduced its pay system in 1996 was planning radical changes. 
Its proposed new pay system is intended to be an integral part of much wider HR changes. 
Already work has been carried out on redesigning core competencies, though at the time of 
our field-work a working group, to include key union representatives, had yet to be convened 
to discuss and design new pay arrangements. The aim is to move away from a system which 
rests on base pay by grade plus a consolidated skills enhancement for certain groups, to a 
system which takes into account the skills and competencies of everyone in the organisation. 
If market supplements are necessary, they might be unconsolidated. These proposals, 
however, essentially do not derive from any evaluation, but from the new HR strategy 
recently approved by the board. 
 
At Royal Mail, as we have noted in sub-section 3.3.2.1 institutional mechanisms (formal joint 
reviews) had been established to consider the results of evaluation. At the time of our 
fieldwork, however, (summer 2001) no further steps had yet been considered because of 
implementation problems. At C & E, there was a sophisticated analysis of the team bonus 
system (see sub-section 3.3,2.1 above) with a report. It was then agreed that there should be 
another trial, but the details had not yet been decided at the time of writing (December 2001). 
 
3.4 Summary 
 
This part of the report considers whether organisations outside the NHS conducted extensive 
evaluation into their new pay systems. We studied seven multi-site, unionised organisations 
and looked first at the aims and objectives of their new pay arrangements. These were 
generally set out explicitly and in some detail. The priority attached to the aims, however, 
varied according to the stakeholder: management or unions.  
 
Although the organisations studied routinely collected a considerable amount of HR data, they 
used only some of the data to evaluate their pay systems and mostly conducted a modicum of 
evaluation. The main exceptions were C & E and RM. At the former, where there was 
extensive evaluation, the new pay arrangement was a trial and it was possible to use control 
groups to evaluate staff attitudes and financial performance. At RM a complex evaluation 
system had been set up based on a range of data and RM (alone of our case study 
organisations) had established institutional mechanisms to consider the evaluation data: 
formal joint reviews. This evaluation, though, had in practice not occurred because of 
implementation problems.  Finally, we were unable to discover steps taken by organisations 
as a result of their evaluation, except at C & E.  
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Part IV Discussion, conclusions and template 
 
4.1 Discussion and conclusions 
 
The literature suggests that evaluation of the impact of new pay systems has largely been 
attempted by academics, not the practitioners themselves and there is little work describing 
how organisations have evaluated changes in HR policies and practices. Management writers 
and consultants have often sought to benchmark the HR function or audit an existing pay 
system, but not to measure the effects of pay changes through a cross-sectional analysis, never 
mind a longitudinal analysis. This is not say that the sorts of quantitative and qualitative 
measures used for HR benchmarking cannot be adapted for the evaluation of a pay system.  
4.1.1 Themes 
 
When considering the evaluation of pay systems, several themes run through this report. First, 
the effectiveness of the pay system may be seen differently by the different stakeholders, a 
point made in the literature and borne out by our interviews with managers and union 
representatives. The second theme is that process has an effect on outcome, not only in the 
design of the pay system as Bowey and Thorpe (1986) found, but also in the implementation 
phase as the Royal Mail experience suggests, see sub-section 3.3.2.3.  A third theme is the 
subjectivity inherent in evaluation, again a point borne out both in the literature and by our 
field-work. Organisations both inside and outside the NHS essentially only chose to collect 
data to evaluate some of their aims.  
 
As to the evaluation itself, the literature review in part I has shown that it is a 
methodologically complex process, a point reiterated in our field-work, see sub-section 
3.3.2.3. In a business environment it is virtually impossible to keep all the internal and 
external variables constant except a reward system and prevent other changes taking place at 
the same time in the organisation.  
 
Furthermore, the link between a HR practice, such as a pay system, and organisational 
performance or customer satisfaction is not direct. There are many mediating factors such as 
management style (see for instance Walton, 1985). Moreover, any association between a 
change in a reward practice and an outcome does not in itself indicate a causative correlation 
(Legge, 2001). Although our field-work indicated that pay systems were designed in the 
context of business objectives, our interviewees did not expect that the pay system would 
directly affect business outcomes. Our interviewees were also of the view that pay systems 
can support, for instance, flexible working, or alternatively provide perverse incentives which 
support inflexibility (for instance by linking allowances to a certain shift or a certain job), but 
do not themselves directly provide flexibility.  
 
A further complication is that many desired outcomes from a change in a reward system, such 
as improved employee commitment or motivation, are inherently difficult to measure. 
‘Harder’ outcomes, however, such as improved productivity, are not easy to measure in 
certain public services, though the Audit Commission and the Office of National Statistics are 
seeking to develop robust tools. 
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4.1.2 Conclusions 
  
Evaluation by organisations of the effectiveness of a pay system does not take place in a 
vacuum and relates to the aims and objectives of the pay system concerned. Moreover, 
evaluation is not an end in itself. It is, therefore, relevant to consider if organisations took any 
further steps as a result of evaluation. Against this background, our research questions were: 
 
• What were the aims and objectives of organisations when introducing new pay 
arrangements? 
• What data did organisations collect and review to inform their evaluation? 
• What steps have organisations taken as a result of their evaluation? 
 
We looked at 10 NHS trusts which had made some innovations in pay and grading. We found 
that they had a range of objectives including simplification, flexibility, affordability, the 
reward of performance, the provision of 24 hour cover and the overcoming of recruitment and 
retention problems. We also found that they had carried out little evaluation themselves 
against these aims. There were a few one-off exercises, which apart from the exercise carried 
out by Urban in 1997, were limited in scope. Additionally academics carried out some 
evaluation in three trusts, but they took the initiative. They were not commissioned.  Just as 
little evaluation was carried out, so NHS trusts made few further changes to their pay systems. 
The altered political complexion of the government in 1997, however, leading to proposals to 
renegotiate the national NHS pay system, with the likelihood that trust pay systems would be 
superseded, was an important factor here. 
  
We then looked at seven multi-site unionised organisations outside the NHS which had 
recently introduced new reward systems. These organisations spanned both the public and 
private sectors and had a range of objectives including simplification, harmonisation, 
overcoming recruitment and retention problems, improving flexibility and the provision of 
equal pay for work of equal value. Like the NHS trusts, however, five out of the seven 
conducted little evaluation and only one (Royal Mail) had established bespoke institutional 
mechanisms, formal joint reviews, to consider the evaluation data. Because of implementation 
problems, however, such joint reviews had not been held as originally planned (see sub-
section3.3.2.3). Moreover, only one of our case study organisations outside the NHS (C & E) 
was taking further steps directly as a result of the evaluation.  
 
Although our literature review indicated that evaluation is less problematic in the private 
sector than the public sector, this was not borne out by our field-work. For instance an 
interviewee at BAE Systems considered that it was not possible to infer anything about the 
effectiveness of the company’s pay system from bottom line indicators. Profitability was too 
dependent upon external factors for financial indicators to be a useful measure of a pay 
system. Our management interviewee at Telecomco made a similar comment. Indeed, using 
Kearns typology, see Figure 1, many organisations, whether inside or outside the NHS, 
essentially either carried out virtually no measurement (‘we think it worked’ – an act of faith) 
or used subjective measures, such as staff responses to a survey. 
  
As we have said, the literature indicates the complexity of the task of evaluation, but this 
research suggests some other reasons why evaluation is often not conducted.  First, managers 
are busy people. They have little time to be reflective. Second, evaluation carries a cost. Exit 
interviews are particularly time consuming, but a rigorous attitude survey, perhaps using 
bought-in expertise is not cheap, nor are focus groups. Third, there is the question of time 
scale. If a one-off exercise is conducted, it is difficult to gauge the optimum time. There is no 
 35
Does it Work? Evaluating a new pay system     Part IV: Discussions, conclusions and template 
such problem with a longitudinal survey which, although labour intensive, provides more 
robust data. 
 
Fourth, and most important, we consider that organisations have little incentive to evaluate. 
New pay arrangements generally take a considerable time to develop, negotiate and 
implement. For instance at one of our trusts (Acute Teaching 3) the design of a new pay 
system for nurses, midwives and their support workers started in 1994, to be followed by the 
first pilot in 1996, after which there was gradual roll-out, completed in 2000. At Telecomco it 
took over four years from initial discussion to company-wide implementation. Managers, 
having spent considerable time and energy in developing and implementing a new pay 
system, are likely to have a psychological investment in its success and thus have little 
inclination to carry out any rigorous evaluation.  
 
Moreover, such new pay structures are put in place for an indefinite period. They are not 
regarded as experimental. They are expensive: perhaps 3 to 5 per cent of the pay bill (Corby 
et al, 2001). If anecdotally it is reported that the new pay arrangements are working 
satisfactorily, or alternatively problems are not reported by middle managers or union 
representatives, senior managers may consider that there is little need to undertake in-depth 
evaluation, following the axiom ‘no news is good news’.  Also, they may not wish to delve 
deeper for fear that evaluation points to the need for some corrective action which might be 
expensive and time consuming. 
 
Indeed the two organisations outside the NHS where the evaluation has been more extensive 
were C & E and Royal Mail (RM). C & E carried out a time limited trial affecting a very 
small proportion (3 per cent) of its employees from an agnostic viewpoint. As the framework 
had been predetermined, C & E’s preparation for the trial took less than six months. It wanted 
to know whether the team bonuses recommended by Makinson (2000) worked before it 
‘bought into’ them, as an interviewee put it. HM Treasury too, which had an overview of the 
trial, wanted a rigorous evaluation. In other words C & E conducted an experiment. It did not 
introduce fully fledged new pay arrangements which had been preceded by lengthy 
negotiations. In RM the new pay system had a controversial genesis. In 1994 RM and the 
Communication Workers Union (CWU) began discussions on what was called an employee 
agenda, only to have an agreement rejected by the membership in 1996. Accordingly a new 
package, The Way Forward, was negotiated but it was also rejected by the membership in 
1999. Finally in 2000 a revised version of The Way Forward was narrowly accepted.  In short, 
there was evidence that these new arrangements might be regarded as less than satisfactory by 
a significant number of the employees affected and thus there was pressure from many 
stakeholders to establish rigorous ways of evaluating the outcome. (See sub-section 3.3.2.1.) 
 
4.2 Template 
 
Against this background of our literature review and field-work, we now consider a template 
for the evaluation of Agenda for Change (AfC).  
4.2.1 Considerations 
 
In drawing up a template we are mindful that there is a balance to be struck between data 
gathering and imposing a burden on managers. There are also cost considerations, given that 
the priority is front line services.  
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Moreover, it is important to exercise what Carter et al (1992:110) call ‘birth control’ if 
managers are ‘not to be drowned in data’. Some data will already exist. For instance trusts are 
now statutorily obliged to collect and analyse data in respect of ethnicity under the amended 
Race Relations Act (Commission for Racial Equality, 2001). Similarly trusts will be 
collecting and analysing certain data as part of HR information systems, eg labour turnover 
data. Such data can then be appraised in the light of AfC. Where data do not exist already, it is 
important to remember that a single instrument can shed light on a range of issues. For 
instance exit interviews can provide data on motivation and recruitment/retention. Similarly a 
staff attitude survey can provide information on patient care, teamworking and the extent to 
which staff consider that their working patterns fit their domestic commitments.  
 
We would also point out that, even where there is a national, organisation-wide agreement, a 
policy decision has to be taken as to whether evaluation is carried out by the organisation 
itself, or by each business/employer/workplace or, perhaps, a mixture. On the one hand, one 
of the organisations outside the NHS (Telecomco) considered that evaluation of its 
organisation-wide agreement should be carried out by each business, as the costs and 
offsetting savings varied according to the extent to which the businesses were affected by 
various elements of the package.  On the other hand, another of the organisations outside the 
NHS (Royal Mail) was evaluating on an organisation-wide basis. This was despite the fact 
that there is considerable autonomy in mail centres and delivery offices and management and 
unions at local level have to negotiate revisions to working arrangements, which vary from 
workplace to workplace. In local government there has been evaluation nationally and at 
council level, though this has been limited essentially to the costs of introduction of the new 
pay system. 
 
4.2.2 The approach 
 
We would suggest that if a change is to be measured rigorously, in this case a new pay 
system, it should be measured longitudinally (a theme which emerged from our literature 
review) and regularly, eg annually.  
 
At this juncture we are not appraised of the way implementation of AfC will take place. It 
seems likely, however, that there will be ready made control groups. If so, the measures we 
suggest can be applied not only in respect of employees who have moved on to AfC, but also 
in respect of those who have not, allowing comparisons to be made. 
 
4.2.3 The measures 
 
With every evaluation measure there are advantages and disadvantages methodologically. For 
instance focus groups can be used to measure staff attitudes, such as felt-fairness and 
motivation, but they are labour intensive and the facilitator requires special skills. Staff 
surveys, of which there is already experience in NHS trusts, are more economical in terms of 
management time and provide more comprehensive, but less rich data than that emanating 
from focus groups. If comparisons are to be made between trusts, however, there will need to 
be common questions in the staff surveys. 
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Table 4. 1 Measures of evaluation  
 
Intention of AfC* Instrument of evaluation  Comment 
Assist ways of working  
efficiently and effectively 
(6.1) 
Reports  by managers 
Self report by staff 
Analysis of overtime levels and costs 
Analysis of costs of agency/bank staff 
 
Managers’ reports should be standardised and anonymous.  
Staff reports can be part of a staff attitude survey. 
 
 
 
Assist achievement of 
quality workforce & 
improve recruitment & 
retention (6.2, 6.3)  
 
Labour turnover statistics  
Stability index 
Exit interviews 
Labour turnover data/stability index should be treated with caution as they are 
influenced by many factors.  
Exit interviews must be carried out in a standardised way if they are to provide 
rigorous data. 
Achievement of a quality workforce is demonstrated by a realisation of the other 
intentions listed and by building on the appraisal system to review training and 
development needs. 
Improve motivation (6.3)  Staff attitude survey 
Exit interviews 
 
If possible a control group should be found. 
 
Improve all aspects of 
equal opportunities, 
especially in areas of 
careers and working 
patterns (6.4) 
The tracking of staff movements within and between 
grades broken down by gender and ethnicity 
Self report by staff on how working patterns fit with 
family commitments. 
The monitoring of training and performance appraisals, by 
gender and ethnicity 
Questions on the extent to which work patterns fit in with domestic commitments 
could be added to the staff survey.  
 
The provisions stemming from the amended Race Relations Act should dovetail with 
and provide data necessary for the evaluation of AfC in respect of ethnicity. 
The meeting of  equal 
value criteria (6.5) 
Composition of earnings by grade & occupational group 
broken down by full-time and part-time and gender 
 
Equal value criteria apply not only to basic pay but also to allowances and premia. 
 
The likely benefits should 
outweigh the likely 
disadvantages (6.8)  
 
Costs: 
- assimilation costs 
- paybill costs overall and by occupational group and 
grade. 
 
Net savings: 
- recruitment (advertising, selecting and inducting) 
- overtime, unsocial hours and shift pay costs 
- employment of agency/bank staff 
 
This suggests a cost/benefit analysis but some costs (eg management time) and some 
savings (eg the ease of grading new jobs because there is a job evaluation system) are 
difficult to measure – see sub-section 4.2.3. 
 
The actual assimilation costs should be compared with the projected assimilation 
costs. 
 
Net savings can be calculated if there is a reduction in the costs of recruitment, 
overtime etc after AfC, when compared to the costs before AfC. 
*These intentions are taken from the jointly agreed statement on AfC issued in October 1999 and the numbers in bold relate to the numbering used in that joint statement. 
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In our literature review we made it clear that the link between a reward system and 
productivity was not direct or linear. It was also suggested by our literature review that there 
were particular problems of measuring productivity in the public services. Interestingly two of 
our private sector management respondents were firmly of the view that it was difficult even 
in the private sector to measure productivity. We understand that the NHS is developing 
measures of unit labour costs but are not aware that such measures could be used to evaluate a 
reward system at this juncture. Indeed the Wanless report (2001) highlighted the significant 
problems of measuring labour productivity in the NHS, see sub-section 1.4.3. 
 
As to user satisfaction surveys, Carley (1988:31) argues that although client satisfaction 
surveys are attractive in theory, they tend to be problematic when used for performance 
assessment, particularly in respect of non-manual professional services. He says: 
 
It is not unfeasible for clients to be dissatisfied with a perfectly adequate service because of a variety of 
unmet needs which that service is not designed to fulfil…. Conversely citizens may quite willingly state 
their feelings about services about which they in fact know little or nothing…  A third problem is that 
citizens may express satisfaction or dissatisfaction with service performance with reference to a general 
orientation towards government and politics. 
 
He also quotes Martin (1986:190) that the degree of satisfaction expressed by clients of a 
public service may be related to the degree of congruence between their expectations and their 
experience. There are particular methodological problems, however, in the NHS compared to 
other public services, let alone the complexity of the link between patient care and the pay 
system. The patient experience will depend on a number of factors (eg cleanliness, availability 
of treatment) and employee attitudes to the patient are just one factor. Also in many cases the 
patient’s condition (eg great anxiety, pain) may colour his/her responses. 
 
We have shown that evaluation must take place against the aims. At the time of writing the 
final aims of the AfC agreement are not known. Accordingly we base our template on the 
‘principles and intentions’ set out in the Joint Framework of Principles and Agreed Statement 
on the way forward, agreed by the parties in October (1999). Some of these principles are 
concerned with process, eg that all aspects of negotiations must be subject to a social 
partnership approach at all levels, or the contents of the agreement, eg that it should be 
capable of being implemented by the management capacity that is likely to be in place, and 
thus are outside the scope of this report. In the main, however, the principles and intentions 
are concerned with the expected outcomes of the AfC agreement and we have used them in 
Table 4.1. 
 
Costs are a prime consideration. As well as the assimilation costs which can be compared 
with the projected costs, we have suggested some measures in the context of principle 6.8. We 
recognise, however, that some costs are difficult to quantify eg the management time spent on 
implementation. Costs, however, must be offset against savings. Again some savings are 
difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. For instance it is difficult to quantify savings in 
management time, eg because the new pay system is simpler to administer or because it is 
easier to grade new jobs in the context of a job evaluation system. Other benefits which are 
difficult to quantify include improved staff motivation and greater teamworking. 
 
Some costs/savings, though, are quantifiable. For instance records can be kept of 
recruitment/induction costs and an average cost calculated and multiplied by labour turnover. 
Similarly, the costs incurred on overtime and unsocial hours/shift premia and the employment 
of agency and bank staff can be recorded. Then these costs can be compared longitudinally (ie 
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before and after the introduction of the new pay system) and, if there are reductions, the net 
savings from AfC can be calculated. 
 
The Department of Health fully recognises that employees leave for a variety of reasons, only 
some of which are pay related and that staff retention is ultimately the key to achieving the 
vision set out in the NHS Plan (Department of Health, 2002:39). Moreover, even if the 
reasons why staff leave are pay related, the level of pay rather than the pay system per se may 
be the causative factor. This is particularly relevant when new pay systems are introduced as 
generally the assimilation arrangements entail an uplift in the level of pay for at least some, if 
not the majority of staff. We consider, therefore, that labour turnover data and a stability 
index are at best a rough guide and only then if the statistics are longitudinal. We are of the 
view that exit interviews provide more nuanced data. At GCHQ a personnel officer, who has a 
pro-forma to follow, interviews every leaver. The results are then collated annually under five 
heads: personal, related to the immediate manager, promotion/ career opportunity available 
elsewhere, higher pay available elsewhere, other. A categorisation on those lines could be 
useful in NHS trusts.  
 
An aim of AfC is to improve equal opportunity and diversity especially in the areas of career 
and training opportunities. This can be evaluated by tracking staff movements both within and 
between grades and monitoring training provision by gender and ethnicity. As to the latter, the 
information required for evaluating AfC will in any event be required under the amended 
Race Relations Act as noted in sub-section 4.2.1, so there should not be a need for additional 
data gathering. 
 
In our interviews as part of our field-work for our earlier report (Corby et al, 2001), we found 
that line managers’ made perceptive comments on flexible working practices and patient care 
by the staff they manage. Accordingly we are of the view that reports by line managers on a 
regular basis would be helpful, especially if they were anonymous, as that would be more 
likely than named reports to engender neutrality in reporting. Such reports, however, will only 
be of limited use unless they are standardised. A pro-forma could be developed with 
categories such as functional flexibility, temporal flexibility, teamworking, attitudes to 
patients. (Functional flexibility may be particularly important in the light of the restrictions on 
junior doctors’ hours.) 
 
We have already suggested that a staff survey would be most useful to assess employee 
motivation. Questions on patient care and teamworking could be added to that survey for a 
minimal extra cost and would provide a different perspective to managers’ reports.  
 
An aim of both AfC and the local government single status framework agreement was to 
provide equal pay between men and women for work of equal value. Neither the local 
government employers nationally or the local authority where we conducted our case study 
(Council) conducted any equal pay evaluation after implementation. Both management and 
unions were of the view that the new job evaluation system was designed to provide equal 
value and had been rigorously tested before implementation. Equal value considerations, 
however, do not apply only to basic pay and thus the job evaluation system. They also apply 
to allowances and premia. Accordingly we suggest that statistics on the make-up of earnings 
are collected at trust level, broken down for occupational group and grade by gender and 
whether full-time or part-time. 
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Table 4.1 provides a template in tabular form. The instruments of measurement are shown 
against the intentions and so may feature in several places eg staff attitude surveys and exit 
interviews. In figure 2, such repetition is avoided and the measures are separated into 
statistical and perceptual measures. 
Figure 2 Measures for evaluation 
AfC
Reports
 from managers
•       Staff attitude surveys
•       Exit interviews
        Labour turnover
        Stability Index
       Analysis of earnings
       Cost benefit analysis
      Tracking staff movements
       Ethnic monitoring
Statistical / NumericStatistical / Nu eric Perceptual / ExplicativePerceptual / Explicative
 
4.2.4 The process 
 
There is a risk that attempts at measurement can serve to induce the attitude that so long as 
sufficient boxes have been ticked, nothing more needs to be done. Measurement, however, is 
not an end in itself. The instruments of measurement must relate to the aims and objectives of 
the pay systems and evaluation should be carried out in order to indicate whether or not 
corrective action needs to be taken.  Accordingly, we are of the view not only that data should 
be collected for evaluation, but that they should be fully considered, so it is important to 
establish institutional mechanisms for so doing. Formal joint reviews, say annually, to 
consider evaluation reports would provide such a mechanism. These could be held either at 
national level, or at trust level, or at both national and trust levels as appropriate. A 
diagrammatic representation is shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 The process of evaluation 
 
Joint review
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4.3 Final comment  
 
This report has looked at how changes in reward systems have been evaluated, suggesting 
measures that could be used to evaluate Agenda for Change. At the time of writing 
management and unions are negotiating a new NHS pay system to result in an agreement to 
apply to NHS employees nationally. Although it is premature, therefore, to focus on 
evaluation at this juncture, the template in this report is intended to provide a basis which can 
be further developed after the AfC agreement is concluded. 
 42
Does it work? Evaluating a pay system 
 
 43
Does it work? Evaluating a new pay system     Annex 
ANNEX 
 
A. 1. Assureco 
 
A.1.1 Overview 
 
A merger led to the bringing together of diverse arrangements into a new pay and grading system. 
Introduced in February 2001, the main aims of the new arrangements were to reward individual 
performance, to recruit and retain staff and to respond to feelings of unfairness held by staff in 
respect of the old pay and grading systems. Evaluation is thus focusing on labour turnover data and 
the annual staff attitude survey. 
 
A.1.2 Context 
 
Assureco, which is a life assurance company, was formed in the late 1990s as a result of a merger. In 
2000 it employed 4,700 people based on two main sites with additional city centre sales offices. The 
sole union is Unifi, which is recognised for employees up to and including supervisors. 
 
In 1999 a new chief executive officer was appointed. He set the objective that the size of the business 
would double and costs would halve over the next five years. In the language of the sector, the 
company would become part of the ‘one per cent world’, ie only one per cent of turnover would be 
spent on business expenses (management interviewee). To achieve this, significant changes in 
organisational structure and practice were required. These included a strategic place for human 
resource management, which, for the first time was given a presence on the Board. Use of technology 
was increased to improve efficiency. Non-core activities such as catering, cleaning, knowledge 
management, IT development and support were outsourced. The number of geographical sites was 
reduced, switching instead to tele-sales and internet based sales and the headcount was reduced. As 
stated in the end of year results for 2000, major initiatives would include significant customer-service, 
partner and intermediary investment and a reduction of business costs through a ‘transformation of 
business processes’ (Assureco, 2000). 
 
A.1.3 Background 
 
As a result of the merger it was necessary to bring together complex and diverse pay, grading and 
benefits systems. Prior to the new pay system, which was launched in February 2001, there were 117 
possible salary grades with over a dozen grading structures. Additionally, some employees received 
benefits and bonuses for historical reasons, for example, mortgage subsidies. The value of these 
subsidies, which were linked to interest rates, ranged from £500 to £2,000 and were paid to 400 - 500 
people. They ceased to be paid to new employees four years ago. 
 
Another factor driving the change to a new pay and grading system stemmed from concerns that had 
been raised through a staff attitude survey about the unfairness of the system. The company undertakes 
an annual staff satisfaction survey, which indicated that staff felt that the existing system of reward 
based on corporate or team performance, did not reflect their individual performance fairly. A further 
factor prompting pay changes stemmed from the high turnover rates of junior and front-line staff. 
Additionally such staff disliked having a variable salary, according to the union interviewee.  
 
Accordingly, ‘the management embarked upon an extensive consultation process with the staff and the 
union to reach agreement on the new terms and conditions’ (IDS, 1999:16). During the design stage, 
 44
Does it work? Evaluating a new pay system     Annex 
the joint consultative committee met monthly and sub-committees were formed to deal with specific 
issues. 
 
A.1.4 Aims and objectives 
 
Against this background the aims of the new pay system for the merged company were to: 
 
• reward individual performance instead of teams;  
• attract and retain the right people at an affordable cost; 
• provide a pay system which staff would find fair. 
 
The intended outcomes were to: 
 
 reduce staff turnover particularly of junior and front-line staff, by ensuring staff were paid a 
competitive rate for the job; 
 increase performance and motivation; 
 get managers to manage people rather than work targets.  
 
A.1.5 The pay and grading system 
 
A.1.5.1 The grading structure 
 
Both the pre-merger companies used the Hay evaluation system and, to unify the systems, the merged 
company chose a grading system used in one of the pre-merger companies as it was similar to that of 
the parent company (IDS, 1999). The new pay system entailed the consolidation of bonus payments 
and the reduction of the numerous grades to seven broad pay bands.  
 
Table A. 1 The banding structure at Assureco 
Jobs Band Section 
Directors 7 
Business heads or most senior in a complex field 6 
Line managers leading a large team of experienced 
professionals 
5 
Team managers or junior professionals and 
equivalent 
4 
Managerial/Professional 
¾ Managed against delivery of objectives 
¾ Roles vary considerably 
¾ Requires flexible approach to reflect 
performance potential and market forces 
Frontline technical roles governed by procedures 3 
Procedure-driven roles requiring good knowledge 
of work area 
2 
Procedure-driven roles, largely governed by 
instructions 
1 
Frontline 
¾ Managed around delegated tasks and 
actions 
¾ Jobs of similar nature 
¾ Work requires a more structured 
approach to reward packages 
Source: 'Your Pay and Benefits' Human Resources, Assureco, 2001:1 
 
The old grades were placed on the new structure through a mapping exercise. According to an 
interviewee ‘we put them to where we felt they should sit’. The process was intuitive and there was no 
job re-evaluation within the merged organisation, so the new system was designed and introduced in 
less than a year. The seven pay bands are split into two sections, managerial/ professional and 
frontline, which reflected ‘the distinct nature of the roles’ (Assureco; undated c:2).  
 
Although research by the company led them to believe that the majority of jobs were paid at a 
competitive rate, the junior front-line jobs were not, and were experiencing fairly high turnover. This 
was particularly so in one of the cities where the company was located, where there is considerable 
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competition for staff in the financial sector. The new pay levels should rectify this. Additionally, these 
staff disliked having a variable salary, so the ratio of variable pay to basic pay was reduced from 15 
per cent to 10 per cent. (Staff were compensated through an extra increment on their basic salary as a 
one-off adjustment.) 
A.1.5.2 Pay progression 
 
The pay bands are revalorised annually to take account of market rates by ‘monitoring the practices of 
our competitors’ and looking ‘at specialist skill sets for which there may be market premia’ (Assureco, 
undated b:2). Movement from one band to another is by promotion. The employee’s position within 
the band, however, depends on his/her performance and potential. This is because an integral part of 
the new pay system is individual performance pay so that ‘you can drive your own rate of progression 
… through your own performance’ (Assureco, undated b:2) and the corporate values and culture are 
spelt out in documentation that explains the system to staff (Assureco, undated c).  
 
Staff in bands 1-3 have their performance appraised twice a year (January and July), when three points 
are awarded for outstanding performance, two points for superior performance and one point for 
expected performance. For each three points awarded employees get a 5 per cent increase in January 
and/or July, but each January the employee starts with a clean slate.  There is no carry-over. 
 
The company acknowledges that the performance appraisal system could be subjective, but that the 
managers 'should know who their good performers are’. There is no mechanism, however, within the 
appraisal system to verify managers’ assessments or ratings of staff. Furthermore, the target setting 
process has not been unproblematic. As an interviewee remarked, managers have been used to 
managing work, not people. In response to these problems the company is proposing to: 
 
• develop managers' people management skills as a matter of urgency; 
• introduce a 360 degree appraisal system for managers;  
• require managers to review quarterly staff targets; 
• require managers and divisions heads to meet together annually to calibrate performance reviews. 
 
For those in bands 4-7, the performance system produces a ‘leadership capability profile’ which has 
three elements: 
 
 performance against goals; 
 leadership; 
 potential, further divided into high potential, potential and lateral. 
(Assureco, undated d) 
 
At the time of our field-work bands 4 and 5 (senior supervisors and junior managers) had not yet been 
appraised.  
 
The new pay system is accompanied by a ‘flexible, supportive employee benefit scheme’ that is 
intended to provide the benefits that staff need and through which the organisation is able to ‘retain 
and recruit high quality people’ (Assureco, undated a: 1, 4). The benefits include pensions for 
permanent staff (initially money purchase but after 10 years’ service on a final salary basis); 
‘maternity pay more generous than the legal requirement’ (Assureco, undated a); crèche facilities at a 
major city site; and private medical insurance for those in band 4 and above and for those below band 
4 aged over 30 with 10 or more years’ service. 
 
The old pay system was full of discrepancies that had accrued over the years. The new system 
integrated the bonuses and benefits, providing one-off payments as compensation. No member of staff 
got less money than before; in fact, all staff were guaranteed a 3.25 per cent rise in pay. 
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A.1.5.3.Anchor points 
 
Within the broad pay bands, so-called anchor points have been introduced for bands 4 and 5. After the 
individual’s performance and potential has been appraised, he/she is to be placed on an anchor point 
and that will determine the amount of the annual pay award (Assureco; 2001a). In addition anchor 
points allow for both vertical and lateral movement within the organisation. This addresses the 
problem of those at the top of a scale who were high achievers but could not before be rewarded 
further and those identified as lateral movers but who had been in the company a long time and 
therefore were on relatively high salaries for their performance.  
 
 
Table A. 2 Anchor points at Assureco 
Anchor Point Descriptor 
3 Consistently superior or outstanding performance and considered to have 
potential or high potential 
2 A mix of expected and superior performance and considered to have potential or 
high potential, OR people considered to be 'lateral' but with consistently superior 
performance 
1 Consistently expected performance, considered to be 'lateral' or 'potential' 
Source: Assureco, 2001a:1 
 
 
A.1.6 Evaluation 
 
The company monitors labour turnover. The new pay agreement was introduced in February 2001 and 
total leavers increased from 19.0 per cent in December 2000 to 24.1 per cent in May 2001 (Assureco, 
2001b). Since then there has been a very slight downward trend in resignations: 23.6 per cent in June 
2001.  
 
The company wants the new pay system to be seen by employees as fair. Thus another tool the 
company uses to evaluate the pay system is the annual attitude survey, called Scope, which usually has 
a response rate of around 85 per cent. The union official interviewed, however, voiced reservations 
about its relevance and reliability. Although a ‘good barometer of feeling’, the last survey was carried 
out before the first set of appraisals under the new system. Employees’ views of the new pay system, 
therefore, will not be captured till the next survey is undertaken. 
 
The company collects data, and shares with the union twice a year details of the spread of performance 
awards per band. According to the union interviewee, staff were rated for potential and not past 
performance, although it was intended that the latter should serve as the yardstick. Indeed, the union 
interviewee claimed that management openly admitted this. 
 
The company intends to use rigorously exit interview data. It plans to employ an external agency to 
conduct exit interviews with former employees on a one-off basis, to establish whether the reasons 
given for leaving are the real ones. It is hoped that an agency will provide a safe and anonymous 
environment for honest feedback, eliminating an employee's worry of jeopardising future references.  
 
The company does not use information on paybill costs to monitor the pay system, although such 
information is collected and one of the aims of the pay system is to attract and retain the right people 
at an affordable cost (our emphasis). This is because in fact the cost of this exercise has not been a 
major issue for Assureco. According to an interviewee, the company knew that some grades needed a 
market uplift and has used money to solve this problem.  (The researchers were not provided with 
information on the actual cost of the exercise.) 
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The union is carrying out its own evaluation. As a result of feedback from members it has concerns 
about the process of awarding performance pay, according to an interviewee. For instance the union 
has been told that the monthly performance review meetings between the manager and employee are 
not always held, particularly where an employee is in one of the first three bands. Also, some 
managers dissuade their staff from using the appeals process, with some forms failing to re-enter the 
appraisal system because of disagreements between managers and staff. Furthermore, according to a 
union interviewee, there is a prevailing feeling that because the new system focuses on how the job is 
done, an ‘atmosphere of fear’ is being created. Staff are worried that if they speak their mind, they will 
be ‘marked down as negative’.  
 
The union interviewee also reported that the work had become more functional, therefore less 
interesting and the union wanted staff to be coached to prepare for the appraisals. Against this 
background, the union is planning to evaluate ‘the quality and timeliness of the appraisal process’ 
through a request to members via a newsletter.  
A.1.7 Comment 
 
It is important to note that the pay system was only introduced in February 2001 and so it is too early 
to expect any changes as a result of the evaluation. There have, however, already been specific 
problems in respect of band four. Local management brought in new staff in that band without openly 
advertising jobs to staff, according to the union interviewee. Also, a new team manager role has been 
created as a high band four position. According to the same interviewee this is a ‘cheap department 
manager role’ and those currently in the band must apply and go on an assessment course in order to 
be considered for this position. According to the union interviewee, those in bands four and five feel 
that their roles are being shifted down, and they are ‘largely being worked out of the company’.  
 
Furthermore, at the time of the field-work (September 2001) those in bands 4 to 5 had not been 
appraised and thus allotted anchor points. The union interviewee said that the anchor point system had 
not been fully defined and the process of transferring people to anchor points would be ‘quite a big 
exercise… [and cause] quite a bit of uncertainty because we haven’t gone through the process of 
assessing where people are going to sit and how those anchor points are going to work’.  
 
One of the aims stated by the company when introducing the new pay system was to respond to the 
feelings that staff had about inherent the unfairness of the old pay and grading system. The union 
interviewee, however, was of the view that the feelings of unfairness of staff in bands four and five 
had been exacerbated and said: ‘management are introducing a new way of working, using pay 
systems to drive it but not putting much effort in to getting staff to buy it’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.2 BAE Systems 
 
A.2.1 Overview 
 
Between June 1997 and December 1998, the Military Aircraft and Aerostructures business unit of 
British Aerospace introduced a new salary structure for professional staff across its seven sites.  
This salary structure survived the subsequent amalgamation with Marconi and the formation of 
BAE Systems.   Although to date there has been no explicit evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
new structure, it is regarded as ‘fundamentally sound’.  Some inconsistencies have emerged in its 
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operation and this has led to a survival of the ‘grade-chasing culture’, a problem currently being 
addressed by management. 
A.2.2 Context 
 
In November 1999 BAE Systems came into being with the amalgamation of British Aerospace and 
Marconi Electronic Systems, the defence arm of GEC-Marconi.  The resulting company is the second 
largest defence contractor in the world after Lockheed Martin, with around 100,000 employees world-
wide and a group annual turnover (in 2000) of £12.2bn.  BAE Systems is organised into the following 
business units: Airbus UK, Aircraft Services Group, Avionics, North America, Australia, International 
Partnerships, and Operations.  These are responsible for managing various product-based programmes 
including those of the Eurofighter Typhoon, the Tornado, the Nimrod, the Harrier, the Hawk, and the 
type 45 destroyer (BAE Systems, 2001). 
 
There were seven sites originally covered by the professional staff salary structure but one site, 
Dunsford, closed in March 2001. Of the remaining six sites, Warton, Samlesbury, Farnborough and 
Brough are mainly programme based, while Preston and Chadderton are the main centres for the 
Operations business unit (BAE Systems, 2001).  In October 2001 there was a work-force of around 
15,000 on the six sites, of whom about 70 per cent were unionised. An additional 40,000 were 
employed on other UK sites. In all there were 100,000 employees world-wide in 2001.  
A.2.3 Background 
 
In 1997 the Military Aircraft and Aerostructures business unit of British Aerospace introduced a new 
salary structure for its professional grades, the largest single group of its employees on the seven sites, 
some 6-7,000 in number. This group encompassed various white collar functions ranging from 
business support, such as HRM, through various engineering and technician roles, to clerical support.  
Implementation followed a 12 month job evaluation exercise overseen by a joint (management-union) 
working group (JWG), although preparatory work for the restructuring had started as long ago as 
1994.   The two main unions, the AEEU, representing manual workers and administrators, and MSF, 
representing the skilled professionals and higher administrators/managers, were involved in the 
process jointly with management. This salary structure continued to be applied after the merger with 
Marconi Electronic Systems. 
 
A.2.4 Aims and objectives 
 
The new system was intended to: 
 
 be self-financing, through efficiency gains;  
 harmonise disparate agreements on seven sites and form a single system across the business unit; 
 simplify the grade structure and make the reward system more transparent; 
 bring salaries up to the ‘market rate’ and improve retention; 
 allow for progression within grades and discourage the ‘grade-chasing culture’; 
 move to a project-based, as opposed to a function-based approach, thus increasing work 
flexibility; 
(British Aerospace, 1997). 
 
The job evaluation (JE) system used was the Watson Wyatt computerised point-based JE technology.   
This choice followed a thorough investigation by the joint working group of three systems: Hay, 
Watson Wyatt, and Towers and Perrin.  The final unanimous choice of the JWG was Watson Wyatt, 
which scored best in the job descriptions it generated, although Hay had been initially favoured by 
management, perhaps because it had been used in the redesign of the executive grade reward structure.  
The Watson Wyatt process succeeded in reducing some 3,000 job descriptions to 600, harmonising the 
seven sites.  
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A.2.5 The new salary structure 
 
The new scheme has six grades (A to F), each of which has a development zone (DZ), intended for 
those who are still gaining necessary knowledge, skills and experience for the grade, a progression 
zone (PZ), intended as the main grade salary structure, and an enhanced zone (EZ), allowing some 
exceptional individuals to remain in grade but to be rewarded in line with their value (British 
Aerospace, 1997).   
 
The maximum salary level for the DZ was set at the “market rate”.  The DZ itself is divided into 10 
equal semi-annual increments,  totalling an increase in salary of 10 per cent from the minimum.  
Progression up the DZ is automatic, subject to satisfactory performance, and its maximum level is the 
entry level of the main PZ, where progression is dependent upon successful performance appraisals 
(British Aerospace, 1997).  Only a few individuals were placed in the EZ.  The following table gives 
an indicative overview of typical salary levels. 
 
Table A. 3 Professional staff salary structure at BAE Systems 
 Effective 1 January 2000 
Grade Example Jobs DZ minimum DZ maximum PZ Maximum
A Clerical staff £11,653 £12,819 £15,382
B Data management officer, 
lithographer, engineering assistant 
£13,519 £14,917 £17,945
C Materials technician design support 
assistant, software (SW) technology 
engineer 4, SW engineer 
£15,499 £17,014 £20,394
D Project engineer, wind-tunnel model 
engineer, SW technology engineer 
3, lead SW engineer, air-traffic 
controller 
£18,295 £20,159 £24,238
E Wind tunnel senior engineer, 
assistant technical manager, lead 
SW engineer, SW technology 
engineer 2 
£21,092 £23,190 £27,849
F Technician group leader, senior 
technical management engineer, 
capability insertion manager, SW 
technology engineer 1 
£24,238 £26,685 £34,725
Source: IDS 2000a 
 
Various fringe benefits (subsidised canteens, health-care, etc) attached to specific grades were 
replaced by monetary equivalents and voluntary contributory schemes (for car leasing or purchase, 
health-care, etc) were introduced for all employees in professional grades. 
 
The unions introduced the scheme to the workforce at Warton to vote on ‘blind’ – ie before they knew 
where on the structure they personally would be placed.  They had already been assured by 
management that ‘no one would lose money’, and there was an additional safeguard in the form of an 
appeals panel, consisting of two trade union and two management members of the joint working 
group, chaired by a senior personnel manager (British Aerospace, 1997).  The structure was accepted 
and subsequently there were only some 70 appeals lodged, some of which were successful, others not. 
A.2.6 Evaluation 
 
There has been major organisational restructuring since the launch of the scheme and this, together 
with changeable market conditions, has meant that the stability necessary for a rigorous evaluation has 
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been lacking.   This may be the reason that there has been no formal review of the structure and its 
implementation.  
 
Nor has it been possible to infer anything about the effectiveness of the scheme from bottom-line 
indicators.  Profitability – and indeed profits – are too dependent upon external uncontrollable factors 
for financial indicators to apply, according to the management interviewee.   
 
Evaluation has taken place, however, albeit in a slightly piece-meal fashion: 
 
• The numbers of staff in each of the three zones of each grade are tracked. 
• Line managers informally feed back their concerns about the scheme to the HR function. 
• The annual employee survey includes attitudinal questions relating to careers and reward.   
A.2.7 Comment  
 
It was – and is still – intended that most employees will be in the progression zone, with the 
development zone intended for starters and apprentices.  At the launch of the scheme approximately 
60 per cent of professional grade staff were placed in the DZ, perhaps reflecting management’s 
perception that salaries at that time had fallen behind the ‘market going rate’, to which the maximum 
of the DZ had been pegged.   By the end of 2000, the percentage of staff in the DZ was still 48 per 
cent - far higher than intended – and this is thought to demonstrate that the grade-chasing culture and 
its effect on grade drift are still apparent.  Line managers come under pressure to promote good staff 
into the DZ of the next grade before they have reached the top of the DZ of their present grade. 
 
The rules of the scheme encourage this approach. In the DZ, the two increments (2 per cent) annual 
advance is ‘automatic’ unless there is very good reason to withhold it, whereas in the PZ, increments 
are discretionary, dependent upon scoring in the annual performance review. An interviewee said that 
some line managers regard this ‘automatic’ advance through the DZ as ‘two per cent extra for doing 
the same’. 
 
The way in which the scheme is funded also contributes to the pressure to pass from the DZ of one 
grade to the DZ of the next, rather than moving up the grade to the PZ.  This is because the additional 
funding for the DZ, where increments are automatic, is prioritised above additional funding for the PZ, 
where increments are discretionary.  In lean years, this has meant that there was little or no funding for 
the award of PZ increments, whereas the two increments were still awarded to DZ staff.  Funds for the 
discretionary PZ increments are sometimes targeted to functions where there is a recruitment or 
retention problem, for instance in engineering, with other functions going without. This has resulted in 
frustration among line managers and, according to an interviewee, an increasing concern that the DZ 
aspect of the scheme ‘was costing too much’. 
 
With grade drift clearly identified as a problem, in 2001 there was a more determined effort on the part 
of management to counter its effect with the introduction of a profile system and specific instructions 
to line managers about promotion. 
 
From the union side, it was noted that the Watson Wyatt job evaluation system was not being well 
maintained.  There is still need for a small number of new jobs to be evaluated and concern was 
expressed that familiarity with the technology for doing this was fading. 
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A.3  Council  
 
A.3.1 Overview 
 
In 2000 the Council implemented the local authority single status framework agreement, after 
conducting a sophisticated job evaluation programme jointly with Unison. The main aim of the 
agreement was to provide equal pay and there has been virtually no evaluation of the new pay 
structure, apart from reviewing paybill costs. 
A.3.2 Context 
 
The Council is a County Council in the south east of England.  It provides a range of services 
including those relating to education, highways and transport, social services, libraries, trading 
standards and waste management. In 2000-2001 it had 14,408 full time equivalent employees in a 
wide range of occupations: professional staff including architects, school teachers, environmental 
health officers and social workers and non-professional staff including clerical staff and manual 
employees.  
  
A.3.3 Background 
 
In 1997 the employers and unions nationally concluded a new framework agreement, providing single 
status for manual and non-manual employees and equal pay between men and women for work of 
equal value. Applying to all staff covered by the National Joint Council (NJC) terms and conditions, 
this agreement then had to be transposed at local authority level. This has not proved unproblematic. 
This is because it allows considerable flexibility to councils, thus entailing further negotiations locally. 
For instance, local government organisations can choose whether to use the NJC job evaluation 
scheme or some other patented scheme.  
 
The Council, somewhat unusually, only recognises one union, Unison, for NJC staff covered by the 
new agreement, so-called green book staff, (though it recognises other unions in respect of teachers 
and fire-fighters). It was the first to transpose the national framework agreement locally, essentially as 
a response to a dispute between the Council and Unison in 1994 over equal pay for work of equal 
value in respect of 1,500 welfare assistants. The legal settlement reputedly cost the Council £420,000 
and ‘demonstrated that in local government… grading and pay structures have evolved in an ad hoc 
way over decades – in many cases continuing in part to embody the attitudes of past generations 
towards what was once thought of as “women’s work”’ (IRS, 2000:12). 
 
A.3.4 Aims and Objectives 
 
The aims were: 
¾ to ensure that the Council was able to demonstrate equal pay for equal value; 
¾ to harmonise terms and conditions; 
¾ to iron out anomalies and variations within grades. 
 
The objectives were to devise a system that was compatible for the local and county context and to 
incorporate anomalies, variations in grades and bonus payment into a holistic system. 
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A.3.5 The details  
A.3.5.1 Developing the new pay and grading system 
 
The Council required the new system to be simpler than the one it replaced, and ideally, to be cost 
neutral (IDS, 2000). As noted in sub-section A.3.3, the Council had discretion in the choice of job 
evaluated schemes.  In fact it reviewed three job evaluation schemes before deciding on the NJC 
scheme. The latter was eventually chosen because it was preferred by the trade union and was thought 
to be more credible to staff.  
 
The process of devising the new system began in 1998, when a job evaluation project (JEP) team was 
set up to oversee the exercise. The team consisted of staff seconded from central personnel services 
and Unison in a deliberate effort to involve the union from the outset, to preclude dissension and meet 
challenges early on. Under the new job evaluation scheme 1,300 jobs were evaluated and the 
programme, which started in 1998 and took almost two years, covered 16,000 staff in two phases: 
7,000 staff working directly for the local authority and 9,000 staff working in the local authority’s 
schools. As a result all ‘green book’ staff were included, but excluded were senior managers (covered 
by separate conditions based on the Hay job evaluation scheme), fire-fighters and teachers or staff on 
Soulbury conditions.  
 
The job evaluation process began with line managers distributing forms for staff to complete and then 
the job evaluation project team assessed the results against NJC criteria, holding interview panels to 
review any job as necessary. Problems arose when dealing with people working on widespread sites, 
such as employees in schools and social services. Therefore effective communication was crucial and 
local managers were used for the dissemination of information. This was not always straightforward as 
they could influence how information was put across.  The Council produced newsletters but these did 
not always get through. With hindsight, the liaison officers who were appointed jointly from the union 
and central personnel services felt that line managers could have been more involved, as they 
complained that they felt 'left in the dark'. 
 
Further problems were apparent from the outcomes of the self-analyses exercises. In the early stages 
of the evaluation process, some staff and managers did not see the importance of their own assessment 
of their jobs, or of the significance of key words. Therefore some people did not describe their jobs in 
sufficient detail, or quantify evidence. As a result, the JEP team recognised the need to provide the 
opportunity for employees to review and re-review their jobs. Subsequently, both the union and 
personnel via the JEP team advised managers to verify the job descriptions of their staff and to be 
proactive in drawing out information from staff, particularly those who ‘undersold’ their roles.  
 
The liaison officers made site visits when these were requested.  According to an interviewee, staff 
were 'told' the new structure and felt that it was 'being done to them' so visits enabled liaison officers 
to explain that implementation had to be staggered over two to three years and that there were winners 
and losers. This may have tempered the frustration of some staff who wanted their increases all at 
once.  
A.3.5.2 Implementation 
 
The new system reduces the plethora of local government manual and white collar grades to a 12 
grade system comprising 46 spinal column points, (see Table A.4). To achieve this, the JEP team 
gathered evidence about job content, made an objective evaluation of that job and devised a score 
hierarchy for it. Another team comprising personnel service managers and Unison representatives 
were completely separate from the evaluators. Their responsibility was to take this information and 
apply the pay model to it in order to achieve the grading structure. The ‘Link’ IT system provided by 
Link Consultancy was an essential part of devising the structure. The software could look at a wide 
range of operational groups and could provide an immediate estimate of cost to assist planning and 
modelling the proposed pay and grading structure. 
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Table A. 4 The pay and grading structure at Council 
 
New grade 
 
JE points range 
 
 
Spinal column points* 
 
New salary range*  
(effective 1.4.01) 
 
1 205 - 260 5 - 7 9,207 -   9,852 
2 261 - 314 8 - 10 10,173 - 19,719 
3 315 - 372 11 - 13 11,418 - 11,970 
4 373 - 409 14 - 16 12,192 - 12,741 
5 410 - 440 17 - 19 13,044 - 13,800 
6 441 - 470 20 - 22 14.301 - 15,210 
7 471 - 499 23 - 26 15,654 - 17,220 
8 500 - 528 27 - 30 17,793 - 19,743 
9 529 - 555 31 - 34 20,634 - 22,194 
10 556 - 597 35 - 38 22,659 - 24,612 
11 598 - 637 39 - 42 25,419 - 27,462 
12 638+ 43 - 46 28,419 - 30,198 
* For substantive grades 
Source: IDS, 2000:49 
 
 
Although there was no performance-related pay to be taken into account, the harmonisation of terms 
and conditions and the resolution of anomalies and variations within grades required the consolidation 
of bonuses. Genuine and relevant aspects (such as unpleasant working conditions, but not unsocial 
hours) were taken into account by the evaluation and assimilated into the scoring system.  This reflects 
the advice of the Employers' Organisation  (2001:1) that the process of review should take in the 'big 
picture' in relation to remuneration. This should include:  
• tied accommodation, 
• premium payments, 
• other fringe benefits. 
 
 
Table A. 5 Assimilation provisions at Council  
Staff whose spine point is Assimilation arrangements 
Within the acceleration zone 1 increment on 1.4.00*  
Accelerated increments from 1.7.00 
Within the transitional zone 1 increment on 1.4.00* 
Annually thereafter until top of substantive grade  
+ all future pay settlements 
Within the substantive grade Normal progression to top of grade 
+ all future pay settlements** 
Within the extension zone No further increments payable after any due in year from 1.4.00 
but all future pay settlements 
Above the extension zone Pay frozen at 31.3.01 until subsequent pay settlements bring pay to the top 
of the  extension and matches employee’s frozen pay, 
Thereafter all future pay settlements 
* only one increment payable on 1.4.00 either under the continuation of an existing entitlement or under the 
special assimilation arrangements 
** The normal arrangements for those entitled to an additional increment where employees have less than 6 
months’ service apply. For employees in the acceleration and transitional zones this increment has been taken 
into account in the assimilation arrangements 
Source:  Unison and Council, 2000:8 
 
There are complex assimilation arrangements. Staff who found their salary out of alignment with the 
new system are being gradually assimilated on to their new grade. Those whose old pay was lower do 
not automatically get a rise for the whole amount straight away, but are being brought incrementally 
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on to the new scale. They are in the so-called acceleration or transitional zones. Similarly staff whose 
previous salary was higher than that determined by the evaluation process have their salaries protected. 
They are in the so-called extension zone or above it. See Table A.5 for details. 
 
Travel, subsistence and annual leave had been harmonised prior to the onset of the job-evaluation 
exercise. Currently, according to an interviewee, other enhancements and allowances are 'going out for 
consultation'. These include overtime and unsocial hours' payments that the Council is trying to 
rationalise. The objective is to reach an agreement in order to bring new rates into effect in April 2002. 
 
The new 12-grade system was implemented from April 2000. Currently, the project team is making 
final searches of payroll records to find any jobs that have not yet been evaluated, in order to 
incorporate them into the system. When this is completed, the team will be wound up and re- absorbed 
into the personnel services department and the system will become embedded within the organisation. 
 
The appeal mechanism, (and final appeals are currently being heard), is an essential part of the 
implementation process.  Grounds for appeal must be specific, and are allowed on two counts: 
 
¾ the evidence used for the evaluation was out of date; 
¾ the evaluation was carried out wrongly. 
 
The team has been careful and meticulous when feeding back the result of the appeal to complainants. 
The interviewee saw this as a way of minimising dissent and dissatisfaction. It was essential that 
systems and procedures were transparent, so an ‘up front’ approach was taken. A help desk, set up by 
the team to deal with enquiries and grumbles, was an essential part of the assimilation process. 
 
The job evaluation system not only provides for job grading, it also enables performance indicators to 
be devised for career progression. The employee's performance is linked to the job evaluation score as 
part of the appraisal process and of training and development reviews.  The line manager submits this 
to an evaluation board, so that the individual may be considered for promotion. 
A.3.6 Evaluation 
 
The main focus of evaluation has been to review paybill costs. Although the initial intention was to 
achieve the changes at nil cost, it soon became apparent that this could not be achieved and the 
Council had to allocate an extra £5 million (IDS, 2000b).  
 
Costs apart, there has been little specific evaluation of the new pay system, although the Council 
collects a wide range of HR data. This is because the main aim was to provide for equal pay for work 
of equal value and, according to those interviewed, this has been achieved though the implementation 
of the job evaluation process. Prior to the job evaluation exercise, the union drew up a list of 
vulnerable groups with a potential for claiming equal pay for work of equal value. The union view 
now is that the new system is likely to have eradicated equal value claims because the system is as 
bias free as possible.  
 
The need for analysing jobs is, however, on-going and is seen as way of continuing to ensure equal 
value.  Although the JEP team is being re-absorbed into the personnel services department, or the 
union, the role of job evaluation analyst is to be retained. The analyst will evaluate newly created jobs, 
and these will be re-evaluated ‘after a few months’ (union interviewee, 2001) to check their accuracy. 
The analyst will also review on-going appeals, as any member of staff or their manager can ask for a 
job review. This may be brought about as job content changes to meet new demands. With the 
inevitability of continuous re-organisation, and the shifting of skills from one job to another, changes 
will need to be tracked within whole job-families and potential problems identified. Therefore an 
Organisational Change Policy has been set up and the procedures that go with it will protect those 
affected. In line with the policy, if a change is proposed, an assessment of the situation will be 
produced and the trade union will consult its members prior to the change being implemented. Then 
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the HR department, according to the union representative, will track the impact of change upon the 
staff. This will involve tracking changes to whole job families and assessing the impact of that change 
on the role and numbers of staff and consulting the union about the implications of change. 
A.3.7 Comment 
 
The new pay system was introduced in accordance with a partnership approach between the Council 
and Unison. The management interviewee regarded this as crucial to the successful implementation of 
the scheme. Similarly the union interviewee considered that a high trust relationship between the 
union and employer was essential. The same interviewee recognised that other councils had 
experienced problems where there was ‘a pre-existing confrontational relationship’.  Because Unison 
was involved from the outset, it had a clear view of what pay options were viable within the budget 
constraints. This involvement was not without problems and put the union in a difficult position with 
its members. The interviewee commented that although there was no hard evidence, anecdotal 
evidence indicated that some staff felt betrayed by the union and resigned from it. On the other hand, 
others who benefited saw the union more positively and this caused some staff to join. 
 
The main thrust of the new pay system has been to provide equal pay for work of equal value. 
Although the new job evaluation scheme is aimed at ensuring equal value in respect of basic pay, 
allowances/premia have as yet not been harmonised and made equal value proof. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.4 GCHQ 
 
A.4.1 Overview 
 
GCHQ’s pay system aims primarily to ensure the recruitment and retention of staff with specialist 
skills. Accordingly evaluation centres on an analysis of labour turnover figures, rigorous exit 
interviews and an annual review of external pay rates for certain staff. 
A.4.2 Context 
 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is a security and intelligence organisation. 
Founded at the end of the Second World War, it is a civil service department responsible to the 
Foreign Secretary. Based in Cheltenham, it has two out-stations in the United Kingdom, in addition to 
some representation abroad and approximately 4,500 employees. (Precise details are not revealed for 
national security reasons.)  
 
As a civil service department, GCHQ recognised the civil service trade unions and was covered by 
civil service industrial relations institutions, policies and procedures. In 1984, however, the 
Conservative government not only withdrew trade union recognition at GCHQ, it also banned GCHQ 
employees from being a member of a trade union and withdrew staff’s statutory protection against 
dismissal. It also set up a staff association, the Government Communications Staff Federation (GCSF), 
which failed to obtain a certificate of independence. The ban lasted 13 years. When Labour returned to 
power, the right to trade union membership was restored to GCHQ. GCSF merged with the largest 
civil service union, the Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS) to form the Government 
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Communications Group (GCG) and a legally binding, ‘no disruption’ agreement was concluded. This 
gave the GCG sole negotiating rights on issues exclusive to GCHQ (Lanning and Norton Taylor, 
1991; Corby, 2000). Both management and union interviewees were of the view that they now worked 
together in a spirit of partnership and that their partnership was more extensive than anything else they 
had come across in other parts of the civil service. 
A.4.3 Background 
 
Some five years ago, GCHQ realised that it was unable to match private sector salaries for some of the 
specialist staff vital to the functioning of the organisation. This coincided with the ending of civil-
service wide pay arrangements, so GCHQ designed its own pay system, having secured Treasury  
agreement. 
 
A.4.4 Aims and objectives 
 
The aims of the pay system are two-fold. The primary aim is to ensure that those with specialist skills 
are recruited and retained. As an interviewee said:  ‘We have people whose skills are highly valued in 
the private sector’, for instance IT specialists. ‘Like any organisation requiring large numbers of 
highly skilled staff, our business success depends on the effectiveness of our recruitment and retention 
processes.’ The second aim is that the GCHQ pay system rewards individual performance and does so 
in a way that employees perceive as fair. 
 
A.4.5 Details 
 
Since the mid-1990s all GCHQ staff below the senior civil service, have been grouped into eight 
grades across three departmental bands. There are some 30 GCHQ employees in the senior civil 
service, so the pay arrangements discussed apply to over 4,450 staff. Movement between departmental 
bands is by promotion. The weight and the responsibilities of the job determine the grade and each 
grade has a base pay range. Between the eight base pay ranges are intermediate ranges available if 
higher pay is required to respond to recruitment and retention pressures in a skill group. Thus where a 
job involves the use of a skill which is in short supply, it is placed in a pay range above the base pay 
range for its grade. Furthermore, each pay range has four fixed points. The first fixed point is the 
minimum. Then there is a maximum for good performers, a higher maximum for very good 
performers and a further maximum for exceptional performers (GCHQ, 2001c).  
 
In order to ensure that similar salaries are paid to those doing similar work, GCHQ grouped those jobs 
requiring pay ranges above the base pay range for the grade into job pay groups (JPGs). As a result 
there are some 14 JPGs, for instance for those with IT skills, linguists, information specialists and 
those engaged in internal audit, accountancy and purchasing work. For example, information 
specialists who are members of the Library Association or the Institute of Information Scientists may 
be eligible to be paid on a range higher than the base pay range for the grade (GCHQ, 2001b).  
 
When the JPGs were created, the centre worked with the senior manager of each career stream/skills 
group, who was given the authority for identifying the skills/market criteria and evaluating an 
employee against the criteria. These JPG ‘authorities’ conduct an annual review into the JPG system, 
led by the human resources department with full union participation. The review team considers 
whether new JPGs are required and existing JPGs are no longer needed. External and internal 
recruitment and retention pressures since the JPG system started have resulted in nearly a third of staff 
being in receipt of pay enhancements. 
  
An individual salary can be at any point in the pay range, subject to his/her maximum as determined 
by the annual appraisal. Progression within a pay range is purely by performance. There is no separate 
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annual settlement based, for instance, on the cost of living and no progression by service related 
increments. Since 1999 the annual performance award has been expressed as a percentage of the range 
maximum for acceptable performers, rather than as a percentage of salary. The performance award is 
consolidated up to the appropriate range maximum, after which it is non-consolidated (GCHQ, 2001a). 
 
All employees if they work shifts are eligible for shift payments expressed as a percentage of basic 
salary. There are five bands from ranging from 12 per cent, where an extended day is worked Monday 
to Friday, to 33 per cent for continuous, seven day working.   
 
A.4.6 Evaluation 
 
GCHQ has not carried out any formal or wide-ranging evaluation of the pay system for a number of 
years, but the introduction of a new management information system in 2001 will make such an 
evaluation much easier in future. In view of the fact that the organisation’s main concern is 
recruitment and retention, the emphasis is on an analysis of labour turnover figures. According to an 
interviewee, this is carried out monthly and consolidated annually. GCHQ also annually monitors the 
pay ranges that are allocated to specific JPGs and relates that to the pay rates offered by its labour 
market competitors.  
 
In addition there is a rigorous system of exit interviews carried out both for labour market reasons and 
for national security reasons. (‘We need to make sure that there aren’t going to be lots of disaffected 
people kicking their heels around outside’, according to an interviewee.) A personnel officer conducts 
the exit interview with the leaver and there is a pro forma to be completed by the interviewer at the 
time of the interview. Data from the exit interview forms are consolidated every month and analysed 
every year when they are used for the JPG review. The main reasons for leaving have been categorised 
by GCHQ as: 
 
• Personal, 
• Related to the immediate manager, 
• Promotion/ career opportunity available elsewhere, 
• Higher pay available elsewhere, 
• Other 
 
Furthermore, GCHQ carries out an annual staff attitude survey but this is not primarily used for pay 
system evaluation purposes.  In a recent survey (GCHQ, 2000) there were over 100 questions but of 
these only one was directed to the JPG system and two to GCHQ’s performance-related pay system. 
Nevertheless, the questions used would enable a judgement to be made on whether employees 
perceived that the performance-related pay system had improved their performance and was 
implemented fairly. Furthermore, according to an interviewee some 18 months ago the equal 
opportunities adviser led a working group looking at the pay system from an equal value perspective. 
(No particular equal value problems were found.) 
 
GCHQ has data on absenteeism, but it does not use that for evaluating the pay system. Similarly, it has 
data on payroll costs and numbers of employees broken down by business unit and by JPG; but as the 
prime aim of the pay system is to ensure that recruitment and retention is sufficient to enable GCHQ to 
carry out its functions, essentially cost is not a criterion in pay system evaluation. (It is, though, a 
consideration in negotiations on the amount of the annual award.) GCHQ does not compile statistics 
on grievances. According to an interviewee, however, grievances that are not resolved locally are then 
passed to the human resources (HR) director. ‘If there were things around pay, then [the HR director] 
will see them and feed them into the normal process of HR… but I would say that grievances don’t 
tend to be about pay. Grievances tend to be about performance management.’ 
 
Trade union representatives at GCHQ have generous facility time. There are some 70 union 
representatives, all with facility time and two (the chair and secretary of the GCG) are on full-time 
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facility time. The GCG is, therefore, able to obtain feedback from members on pay through the labour 
intensive method of small group meetings. In addition this year the GCG carried out a pay survey of 
all its members but with hindsight, according to a union interviewee, realised that many of the 
questions had been badly designed. Accordingly that survey has proved in practice to be of only 
limited use. 
A.4.7 Comment 
 
The ‘authorities’ are part of the skill group whose pay they are determining, so it may be in their 
interests to err on the side of generosity when evaluating an individual’s skills, to make sure that the 
JPG is fully up to complement. This is exacerbated by the fact that the ‘authorities’ have no incentives 
for budget control, according to an interviewee, which leaves the centre trying to hold the ground. The 
same interviewee also commented that employees interpret the JPG system as a skills enhancement for 
specific groups, rather than as a market supplement, although it was originally conceived as the latter. 
She added:  
 
The trouble with any recruitment and retention system is that it implies that money is a primary 
motivator, which in the public sector, and certainly in GCHQ, it really isn’t. By throwing extra money 
at some sectors of the workforce we implied that their contribution was valued more highly than others 
with core skills but no external analogue. What we are trying to do now is move pay down on the 
agenda and actually get people to take a rounded picture of all the benefits they receive [such as 
generous annual leave allowances and non-contributory pensions]. 
 
A potential problem is that the JPG system, which is built round job families, may undermine cross-
functional working ‘and it is a bear trap we can see coming’, according to the management 
interviewee. To counteract such problems, multi-functional action learning groups have been set up 
and their outcomes are being evaluated.  
 
Currently HR policies and practices are being redesigned in line with a HR strategy recently approved 
by GCHQ’s board. Already work has been carried out on redesigning core competencies. Next there 
will be a redesign of the pay system, which a working group, to include key union representatives, will 
take forward. The aim is to move away from a system which rests on base pay by grade, plus a skills 
enhancement for certain groups, to a system which takes into account the skills and competencies of 
everyone in the organisation and, if market supplements are necessary, to consider whether or not they 
should be consolidated. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
A.5 HM Customs and Excise 
 
A.5.1 Overview 
 
HM Customs and Excise (C & E) conducted a nine month trial of team bonuses in 2000/01. There 
was an extensive evaluation, with an external consultant employed, looking at staff attitudes, 
performance data and customer satisfaction. The results, however, were complicated by other, very 
extensive changes taking place in the department.  
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A.5.2 Context 
 
HM Customs and Excise (C & E) employs 22,000 people, with offices throughout the country 
(Cabinet Office, 2001).  Its main responsibilities are to collect and manage Value Added Tax (VAT) 
and excise duties; fight drug trafficking and enforce other import and export prohibitions and 
restrictions on, for example, firearms and endangered species; collect customs duties and agricultural 
levies on behalf of the European Union; compile trade statistics; and give policy advice on these 
subjects to Ministers (Cabinet Office, 1994). 
 
A.5.3 Background 
 
The Customs and Excise Board gave a commitment early in 2000 to carrying out a trial of team 
bonuses. Such bonuses were recommended in a report by John Makinson, Group Finance Director of 
Pearson plc as part of the work of HM Treasury’s Public Sector Productivity Panel. Makinson looked 
at performance based incentives within four civil service departments/agencies: Employment Service, 
Benefits Agency, Inland Revenue and C & E. He started with two assumptions: that performance 
incentives can improve public sector productivity and that the current incentive arrangements in the 
civil service were largely discredited. In short he proposed a change from individual, consolidated 
performance awards to non-consolidated team bonuses (Makinson, 2000). 
 
A.5.4 Aims and objectives 
 
Essentially the main objective of the trial, which took place from 24 July 2000 to 31 March 2001, was 
to find out whether team bonuses led to an improvement in the productivity and performance of staff. 
Within this overarching objective, the aims were to find out: 
 
• if staff understood the targets and considered them to be equitable; 
• if individuals within the trial sites were working more as a team; 
• if certain practical details, eg team size, the selection of targets, the form of bonus payment, posed 
problems; 
• if there was evidence of any contra-effects, eg an increase in inflexibility, a movement away from 
the corporate ethos and victimisation, where a team member was not considered by other 
colleagues to be pulling his/her weight. 
 
(Makepeace, 2000; Marsh 2001) 
 
According to a union official interviewed, the main union, the Public and Commercial Services Union 
(PCS), was particularly interested in the last aim. 
A.5.5 Setting up the trial 
 
A two person project team and then a working group of some 10 people representing the main 
business areas together with finance and planning were established. In addition the Institute for 
Employment Studies (IES) was employed as a consultant. The project team first visited some 
organisations which had a team bonus system and then turned to establishing a team bonus system at 
C & E. 
 
As part of the 2000 pay settlement union members agreed to support the trial and the departmental 
trade union side was consulted throughout, as a union official confirmed. He said: ‘We have been fully 
involved from start to finish’. For instance the trade union side discussed with management where the 
trials would take place and the targets to be selected; a union official attended all the meetings of the 
trial team leaders; and PCS was given slots on management events to present its views. 
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Six trial sites (out of 15 volunteers) were selected covering a broad geographic area and representing 
outfield operation areas and the central processing functions. Teams comprised 80 to 260 employees 
with one team per trial site and involved some 700 staff overall, ie 3 per cent of C & E’s employees.  
The working group and the six trial site managers held several workshops, for instance to discuss the 
selection of targets. Each team had five incentive targets drawn from, and compatible with, existing 
plans, using a balanced score card approach. So at least one target was financial, at least one related to 
customer service and all had to be consistent with the department’s public service agreement with the 
Treasury. The working group moderated the targets which were all given equal weighting. The 
achievement of a target entitled those in the team to a bonus of 1 per cent of salary, ie a 5 per cent 
bonus if all five targets were achieved. The achievement of existing operational targets, however, was 
made a pre-condition for the receipt of a bonus payment (HM Customs & Excise, undated). Other 
details, eg the minimum qualifying period throughout the duration of the trial (set at 89 days) and how 
this should be calculated for part-timers, absentees and those on detached duty were also agreed and 
the trial proceeded (HM Customs & Excise, 2000). 
 
A.5.6 The evaluation 
 
The evaluation was in-depth. A prime element related to the motivational and attitudinal aspects. A 
staff attitude survey was carried out in July when the trial started in the six trial sites to establish a 
baseline. The survey questionnaire included generic questions about working for C & E and about 
local management and some very specific questions about pay and team pay. Also staff attitude 
surveys were sent to three control sites (Institute for Employment Studies, undated).  Conducted by 
IES, these staff attitude surveys were repeated in June 2001, after the trial concluded and staff had 
received their bonus payments. In addition during the course of the trial the two person project team 
conducted three focus groups in each of the six sites: one for clerical/junior grades, one for middle 
managers and one for senior managers, ie 18 in all.  
 
A second element of the evaluation related to financial performance. This was measured by 
establishing a baseline for the trial sites and three ‘blind’ control sites.  Because of the nature of the 
work of the teams selected for the trial sites ‘that was quite factual’ according to an interviewee. As to 
customer satisfaction, one site conducted a customer satisfaction survey at the beginning and end of 
the trial period and all the sites used their own local audit teams to carry out quality assurance. 
 
Information was also sought from the trial site managers about complaint rates, staff turnover, sick 
leave. According to the project leader, however, this data was of limited use because the trial was 
conducted for only a short time (less than nine months). Information was also sought from managers 
about how they considered they were managing and whether or not there was increased pressure by 
some team members on colleagues whom they (rightly or wrongly) saw as not pulling their weight.  
 
The main union also carried out its own enquiries as to how the team bonus experiment was working.  
It convened two meetings of PCS representatives from the six trial sites to ‘deal with issues and 
difficulties that have arisen during the trials and to identify any general problems that require central 
intervention and negotiations’ and kept in touch with representatives by email (Duggan, undated). 
According to the union official interviewed, ‘we had very few, very few indeed, problems’. 
 
A.5.7 Comment  
 
The main difficulty encountered stemmed from the fact that the evaluation took place at a time of 
widespread change, including the restructuring of the department and the setting up of new 
appointment, promotion and appraisal systems. In short, according to an interviewee ‘there’s been a 
lot of noise in the system’ that complicated the evaluation of team bonuses.  
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Furthermore the chairman (a new incumbent) spoke to all managers (grade 7 and above) about what he 
expected from them. According to an interviewee, many trial site managers told the project team that 
they were now managing ‘perhaps in a way that we ought to have been for years’. For instance they 
said that they were now involving staff monthly in information and discussion about the team’s 
progress towards the achievement of targets ‘which hadn’t happened before’ and the focus groups of 
staff confirmed this. The project team was unable to establish the extent to which the chairman’s 
intervention, as opposed to the team bonus system, had contributed to the delivery of results. Indeed, 
performance targets were exceeded both in the trial sites and the control sites, with all the trial team 
members receiving the 5 per cent bonus, which severely limited the effectiveness of the evaluation. 
 
Even though the Makinson report (2001) delineated the main elements of the scheme, the 
implementation of the trial for some 700 staff and the evaluation were resource intensive. Apart from 
the time of the trial site managers and the members of the working group, the two senior staff who 
formed the project team devoted their time entirely to the trial. There was also a sum paid to IES (not 
disclosed for commercial in confidence reasons). According to the project team leader, however, it 
was most useful to have external input into the evaluation, not only for help with the staff attitude 
survey but also to act as ‘critical friend’ and a ‘sounding board’. 
 
This case study is not reporting on whether the trial was a ‘success’ or whether or not certain aspects 
should be modified. Its focus is how the team bonus system was evaluated and any evaluation 
problems encountered. It has been decided, however, that there will be another, more extensive trial 
commencing early in 2002, but at the time of writing (November, 2001) decisions had yet to be taken 
on the details. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.6 Royal Mail  
A.6.1 Overview 
 
In February 2000 Royal Mail introduced a complex new pay and conditions package aimed at 
improving efficiency and basic pay and reforming working patterns. Evaluation is primarily centred 
on joint management/union reviews and a range of personnel data are collected and shared with 
the union to inform the reviews. Evaluation, however, has not taken place as planned, essentially 
because of implementation difficulties. 
A.6.2 Context 
 
Consignia plc (formerly the Post Office Group) is a public limited company owned by the government 
and regulated by PostComm under the Postal Services Act 2000. It is facing increased competition as 
the European Union Postal Services directive 97/76/EC heralded greater liberalisation in the supply of 
postal services across the European Union, while PostComm has begun licensing private sector 
companies to compete with Royal Mail (Brown, 2001a).  
 
Consignia is divided into 12 business units, with three core services: Parcelforce Worldwide, Post 
Office branches and Royal Mail (RM) (Consignia, 2001). The latter is responsible for the collection, 
sorting and delivery of letters and packets with some 80 million items carried every day (Post Office, 
2000). Consignia has in total 200,000 employees. Of these 150,000 work for RM as postal operatives 
or in operational support and the vast majority belong to the Communication Workers Union (CWU).  
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A.6.3 Background 
 
Industrial relations in Royal Mail is carried out against the background of the Industrial Relations 
Framework, agreed in 1992 and then revised in 1994.  It sets out the principles for reaching local 
agreements, including the resolution of disagreements and the arrangements for so-called strategic 
involvement, ie discussions between managers and the CWU nationally about the future of the 
business (Sawyer et al, 2001).   
 
In 1994 Royal Mail and the CWU began discussions at national level on what was termed the 
‘employee agenda’, which included new productivity arrangements through the use of teams of six to 
15 people and a shorter working week. The CWU’s Postal Executive rejected this agreement, 
concluded in 1996, and industrial action ensued with the letter monopoly suspended. The dispute 
ended with the establishment of joint working parties and then agreements in 1998 on a conduct code 
and attendance procedures, delivery issues and a performance bonus scheme (PBS). In addition, a new 
package called The Way Forward was negotiated. Rejected by the membership in September 1999, it 
was revised essentially in respect of overtime pay and the driving allowance. After a second ballot in 
February 2000, a bare majority accepted the package (CWU undated; IDS 2000c). 
 
A.6.4 Aims and objectives  
 
The Way Forward package comprises eight agreements on employment security, pay and grading, 
shorter working week, annual leave, meal breaks, way of working, working time regulations and 
deployment. In short, the objectives were to improve customer service and efficiency; create a better 
working environment, improve pay and conditions and provide the capability for quick and successful 
introduction of change through timely consultation and negotiation at all levels (CWU 2000a). Within 
these overarching objectives the pay and grading agreement introduces a single operational grade in 
place of the two postal grades in order to: 
 
• increase the skills, pay and range of opportunities; 
• improve operational performance and flexibility; 
• provide a significant increase in pensionable pay…  [and] a move away from excessive levels of 
overtime. 
(CWU, 2000a:6) 
 
The way of working agreement has five objectives as follows:  
 
a) to improve customer satisfaction through delivering service to specification consistently and 
reliably throughout the Business; 
b) to improve efficiency by ensuring accurate alignment of staffing to workload; 
c) to create a better working environment through ensuring a fair approach to allocation of duties, 
overtime and annual leave; 
d) to provide better understanding and opportunities for movement and development through and 
across the Businesses; 
e) to develop the capability for speedy and successful introduction of change whilst protecting 
services to our customers in a way that builds on the principles within the Industrial Relations 
Framework. 
(CWU, 2000a:23) 
 
The working time regulations agreement aims ‘to move towards socially acceptable patterns of 
attendance that will ensure all employees have proper breaks from work, thus promoting family-
friendly employment which is beneficial to both employees and the employer’ (CWU 2000a:39). The 
deployment agreement is concerned with the approach to the implementation of all the other seven 
agreements and sets out target dates. Its objectives are: 
 
 63
Does it work? Evaluating a new pay system     Annex 
• the deployment of The Way Forward agreements in full, everywhere and to the agreed timescales 
and specifications; 
• the achievement of the agreed performance improvements in all operational units in line with the 
PBS agreement; 
• the implementation of the agreed improvements to terms and conditions for all employees covered 
by The Way Forward agreements, including an increase in the number of five-day week 
attendances in line with the associated agreements on delivery, PBS and The Way Forward; 
• maintaining the balance through deployment between implementation of improved terms and 
conditions and performance improvement. 
(CWU. 2000a:45). 
A.6.5 The details 
 
The eight agreements are complex. The agreement on employment security provides a management 
undertaking and ‘if circumstances change’ the undertaking will be reviewed ‘with full strategic 
involvement of the CWU nationally’ (CWU, 2000a:5). The pay and grading agreement, as noted 
above, introduces a new single operational grade and also a new operational support grade, though 
there are certain personal reserved rights. These new grades have a higher basic rate, partly made up of 
new money and partly made up of the consolidation of Saturday premia and weekly supplements, with 
non-consolidated overtime payments at an enhanced cash rate (instead of a multiplier of basic pay) and 
new shift pay allowances. The shorter working week agreement provides for a working week of 40 
hours gross, instead of 41½, with new standard meal breaks, to be implemented on a unit-by-unit basis 
after a restructuring of duty patterns and an adjustment of the bonus scheme. 
 
The agreement on annual leave incorporates RM’s 2½ customary days and its main change is to 
provide six weeks after 20 years’ service, instead of five weeks after 30 years’ service. In addition, 
those with less than 20 years’ service can increase their annual leave to six weeks a year in return for 
foregoing an element of basic pay. The meal break agreement establishes a new national standard, 
with the actual pattern of breaks to be arranged locally.  
 
The way of working agreement ‘is a key enabler and the final step in securing and introducing 
improvements in terms and conditions’ (CWU, 2000a:23). It is a detailed agreement which covers, for 
instance, the filling of vacancies, employee development, workload forecasting, new seniority 
mechanisms and employee resourcing procedures. The working time regulations agreement defines 
working time and reduces the gross hours an individual is allowed to work in any single week in 
phases: to a maximum of 80 hours from 3 April 2000, to 70 hours from 2 October 2000 and to 65 
hours from 7 October 20002. The final agreement in The Way Forward package covers deployment, or 
what might be called implementation, setting out, for instance, the roles and responsibilities of 
managers at different levels, union officers and union representatives and referring to deployment aids, 
such as guidelines, training and workshops. 
 
A.6.6 Evaluation 
 
The Way Forward agreements set out certain evaluation measures by establishing joint reviews. Thus 
the way of working agreement says: 
 
There will be formal joint reviews of progress at key agreed milestone dates during and after 
implementation. These will assess progress against the aims of the agreement, take appropriate 
corrective action and identify good practice (CWU, 2000a: 33). 
  
Similarly, the working time regulations agreement provides for formal joint review meetings in April 
each year to determine whether the timetable and implementation steps remain achievable when 
assessed against the agreed success criteria. (The latter include progress towards socially acceptable 
attendance patterns and statistical confirmation of the maintenance of average earnings.) In the same 
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vein the pay and grading agreement provides that ‘ to protect both the value of the new package to 
employees and Royal Mail’s financial position, the actual effect of these changes will be reviewed 
nearer or just after implementation’ (CWU, 2000a:12). Finally the deployment agreement says that 
‘both parties agree that progress will be regularly monitored at all levels… In addition there will be a 
formal review of progress at national level. This will happen monthly’ (CWU, 2000a:47).  
 
These joint reviews are to be supported by a range of data already collected by Royal Mail and shared 
with the union. Thus Royal Mail monitors paybill costs and collects data on all the different elements 
of earnings, for instance on average basic pay, average shift payments, average overtime payments, 
average performance bonus system payments and average hours worked, broken down for full-time 
and part-time operational grades and operational support grades and by location. Furthermore, there is 
a regular print-out of all those who are working over a given number of hours for several weeks and 
frequent reports from local managers to RM headquarters on progress on restructuring working 
patterns.  In addition, it collects other information which is shared with the union but has not been 
specifically used to evaluate the pay system: the results of the annual staff attitude survey and the 
customer satisfaction surveys, overall measures of the time taken between the posting of letters and 
delivery, monthly labour turnover figures and data on sickness absences.   
 
According to a union interviewee, RM supplements its extensive information with frequent discussion 
with the union. Also, the so-called indoor secretary, dealing with staff in mail centres, and the outdoor 
secretary, dealing with delivery staff, are ‘constantly in contact’ with divisional representatives who 
monitor progress, according to an interviewee. Until recently, however, the union has been reacting to 
problems brought to light by members and/or their representatives, but it is now taking a proactive 
stance and visiting workplaces to talk to members and examine their pay. A particular and on-going 
concern for the union has been the monitoring of overall earnings and  basic pay as a proportion of 
total pay and this is being done by the union’s research department to inform future pay negotiations. 
 
In short, there is a sophisticated evaluation system comprising the collection and production of a wide 
range of information, with formal joint management/union reviews. In practice, however, evaluation 
has been stymied because of implementation problems. The Way Forward agreements require change 
to be deployed throughout mail centres and delivery offices through detailed, negotiated revisions to 
working arrangements; but in September 2001 The Way Forward package had ‘yet to come into force 
in more than a third of the 870 delivery offices1, including 104 in London’ (Brown, 2001a:9). 
According to an independent report primarily this stems from the fact that the overall majority in 
favour of acceptance of The Way Forward agreements was very small and in many workplaces a 
majority voted against them. As a result, workplace negotiations have often been protracted and even 
when agreement has been reached, members have voted to reject it. This same report also criticised 
both local managers and local union representatives, finding that often there was a ‘vicious circle of 
hard attitudes and hard responses’ (Sawyer et al, 2001:19).  
 
According to a CWU official interviewed, problems of implementation partly stemmed from the fact 
that RM sent out numerous directives to local managers explaining The Way Forward deal and how it 
should be implemented, without allowing time for the union to go through the draft directives and 
highlight its concerns. This has led to differences at workplaces between management and the union 
on interpretation and national union officials have spent their time fire-fighting local disputes. In 
summer 2000 a former Post Office manager and a former CWU deputy general secretary conducted an 
internal inquiry into the implementation process. Although the inquiry’s report was not given to the 
researchers, interviewees said it criticised payroll. Employees, particularly those entitled to pay 
protection, were sometimes not being given their correct pay. It also made a number of 
recommendations, including pay audits, whereby ‘those who understand the complexities of the pay 
deal go out and talk to the people in the largest mail centres, the ones where they have had the most 
problems’, according to an interviewee.  
 
                                                          
1 The Consignia annual report for 2000 – 2001 puts the number of delivery offices at 1,400 and the number of 
mail centres at 70. 
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The same union official also pointed out that the PBS had proved contentious. He took the view that it 
was a ‘dubious measure’, particularly for outdoor workers. At the time of writing only 10 per cent of 
offices in the PBS were getting ‘any real financial benefits’, though 90 per cent of offices are in the 
scheme and so are set to receive benefits.  This may be partly because PBS is not paid where there are 
circumstances beyond RM’s control which affect delivery, eg railway disruption following the 
Hatfield crash in 2000. Both management and the CWU have recognised problems with the PBS 
system and, as a result, agreed a joint statement on a ‘PBS recovery plan’ as part of the 2000 pay deal 
for delivery staff (CWU, 2001). At the time of writing, however, problems with ‘targetry’ and 
productivity improvements had yet to be resolved. Another area of contention is the working time 
regulations agreement. Although hours of work have been reduced, staff have not always received 
compensatory earnings opportunities. 
 
According to a RM manager interviewed, although in theory RM is a unified, command and control 
organisation, in practice there is considerable local autonomy. As a result, it has not been easy to 
implement a nationally agreed package which leaves many of the details, for instance the structure of 
delivery rounds, for local agreement. 
 
Whatever the reasons for slow implementation, against this background there has been a rise in 
industrial action, mainly unofficial, none of it nation-wide, mostly triggered by the conduct code and 
the attendance procedures, but partly triggered by Way Forward disputes (Sawyer et al, 2001). In the 
year to 25 March 2001 there were 60,000 working days lost (Consignia, 2001).  
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, while information for evaluation as detailed above is collected by RM and 
shared with the CWU, some of the formal joint reviews have not taken place. For instance, according 
to an interviewee, there has been no formal joint review of the costs incurred in respect of the pay and 
grading agreement though ‘there is ongoing dialogue between senior managers and senior union 
officials’, according to a management interviewee. Similarly there have not been formal joint reviews 
of the way of working agreement at key agreed milestone dates during and after implementation. On 
the other hand there are monthly joint meetings to review the deployment agreement. 
 
A.6.7 Comment 
 
The latest annual report (Consignia, 2001) says that there has been an unexpected increase in 
employee costs of  £33 million over budget (in the context of a paybill of £3.5 billion). According to a 
management interviewee, this is partly because RM front-loaded the money before realising the 
efficiency savings obtained through restructuring duty patterns. He added, however, that ‘because 
other things have been going on’, the accountants had not been able to pinpoint the costs solely arising 
from the agreements. 
 
Clearly there have been problems of implementation, which have in turn led to interruptions in an 
agreed and sophisticated programme of evaluation. One result is that RM’s central personnel 
department has formed project management teams in respect of various aspects of the agreements, 
reporting to a project board. The announcement by Consignia in October 2001 that it needed to make 
£1.2 billion cost savings has led to a deterioration in the industrial relations climate and is likely to set 
back implementation of the agreement further (Brown, 2001b).  
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A.7 Telecomco 
 
 
A.7.1 Overview 
 
In October 2000 the company introduced a new pay and grading system for its 80,000 non-
managerial employees, after two and a half years of negotiation with the trade union. This involved 
the harmonisation of pay and grading and conditions of service for several separate occupational 
groups.  While the company regularly monitors employment costs, employee turnover, absence rates 
and employee attitudes, there was no specific evaluation of the new pay and grading system. There 
are costs and off-setting savings from the new pay system  and the major issue from the 
management perspective is whether the new agreement meets its objectives of delivering flexibility 
at reasonable cost. 
 
A.7.2 Context 
 
This organisation is a large multinational telecommunications company registered in England and 
listed on the New York, London and Tokyo stock exchanges. Its principal activities include local, long 
distance and international communications services, mobile communications, internet services and IT 
solutions. In April 2000 the company was restructured into four new self-contained business units 
which reflect market sector rather than geography. In May 2001 the company announced the creation 
of two separately listed companies (Telecomco, 2001).  
 
The company employed 137,000 people in 2001, of whom 117,900 were based in the UK. In addition 
some 13,000 temporary people were employed during the financial year to April 2001. An estimated 
75 per cent of the company’s UK workforce belong to one of two recognised trade unions 
(Communications Workers Union and Connect). The company continues to restructure its workforce 
and in the year to April 2001 some 3,500 managers and professional people left the company through 
voluntary redundancy. The company has recently formed a joint venture with Accenture (formerly 
Anderson Consulting) to deliver outsourced human resources services to large organisations, as well 
as to Telecomco itself (Telecomco, 2001).  
 
The company operates an employee share ownership scheme under which each year a percentage of 
pre-tax profits is set aside to purchase shares for employees. Employees also have the opportunity, 
from time to time, to buy shares at a discount under the Employee Sharesave Scheme. The company 
runs an annual employee attitude survey and a staff suggestion scheme which generated 8,000 
suggestions in the year to April 2001 and which contributed £85 million of savings (Telecomco, 
2001). 
 
A.7.3 Background 
 
Pressure for reform of the existing pay and grading system built up over a long period, mainly because 
technological change led to major changes in the organisation’s staffing needs and highlighted the 
structure’s inflexibility. With the development of new areas of business, such as call centres and high-
tech data communications, fitting new job titles into the existing structure became increasingly 
difficult. In parallel, a number of existing areas declined and hence the demand for some existing jobs 
(such as telephone operators) diminished. Moving staff from declining areas of the business to 
expanding areas was restricted by the multiplicity of terms and conditions and by notions of status 
attached to particular occupations.  
 
Accordingly management and unions wanted to replace several grading systems, which dated back 40 
years, and bring together a number of distinct bargaining groups on to a single pay and grading 
 67
Does it work? Evaluating a new pay system     Annex 
structure. Joint discussions began in 1996 and a union interviewee commented that the first 18 months 
were ‘spent on deciding the big picture and what the joint vision was’. While there was 
communication with managers and staff from the start, a lot of testing out of ideas took place jointly 
with the union at national level. Negotiations began  in earnest in 1999 and separate joint 
management/union working groups were set up in three areas: grading, terms and conditions and 
learning and development. Because the company does not have a core activity, the priority was to find 
a framework that was acceptable internally to the managers of the different businesses and was 
broadly acceptable to the union. It was therefore decided not to concentrate on the differences between 
businesses but on how they all related to the external market. 
 
Nearly all the details were encapsulated in the agreement and this avoided misunderstandings during 
implementation and a full communication exercise with all employees only began once the agreement 
was signed. In September 2000 the final proposals were put to the union’s membership in a ballot, 
which was successful, and in the following month the main aspects of the new pay and grading system 
were introduced. Entitled NewGRID,  it represented a major overhaul of the terms and conditions of 
the company’s non-management grades, covering over 80,000 employees: cleaners, clerical, 
secretarial and sales staff, engineers, operators, technicians and computing staff.  
 
A.7.4 Aims and objectives 
 
The three main aims of the new agreement were to: 
 
• create an integrated pay and grading structure;  
• introduce common terms and conditions for all non-management employees; and  
• establish an ‘open culture’ in learning and development . 
 
According to an interviewee, the company stated that its ‘overriding background principles’ were to 
remove barriers to flexibility and to introduce arrangements that were simple, ie easy to understand 
and administer; and affordable, ie cost effective and beneficial to staff. The company  also sought to 
take account of external and internal best practice. The vision for NewGRID was ‘to provide a single 
integrated non-hierarchical structure’ that will remove existing rigidities and barriers to people moving 
to new roles, as well as enabling organisational effectiveness and productivity/efficiency 
improvements.  The new structure was also designed to support career development of staff and enable 
them to meet the changing needs of the business, customer requirements and product innovation 
(CWU 2000b:1). While equal value is a consideration, this was not a prime driver behind the changes 
(interview with HR manager).    
 
The benefits of NewGRID were listed as follows: 
 
1) Enable flexibility by: 
• introducing a simplified structure and reduced number of grades; 
• introducing a single set of improved terms and conditions; 
• taking a fair and consistent approach to everyone. 
 
2)  Help people to take control of their own careers by: 
• providing development and progression opportunities; 
• providing a structure to encourage people to adopt the will to learn to enhance their own careers. 
 
3) Lead to a changing culture by 
• enhancing the relationship between the company and individuals; 
• enhancing the relationship with the union. 
 
4) Boost performance by 
• getting people with the right skills into jobs; 
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• increasing the movement of people through jobs; 
• reducing the risk of intractable surplus. 
 
5) Support commercial behaviour by 
• pay levels being amongst the best against our competitors and other leading companies; 
• reducing administration costs; 
• ability to anticipate future trends; 
• enabling easier change in the future; 
• facilitating the company’s transformation to ‘the next wave’. 
 
6) Provide improvements to existing arrangements through  
• reduced hours; 
• improved holiday arrangements; 
• unparalleled pay and pension protection arrangements; 
• greater number of highly paid roles; 
• improvements to shiftworking and on-call. 
 
A.7.5 The new pay system 
 
A.7.5.1 The pay and grading structure 
 
To meet the differing types of business, to harmonise and simplify the pay structure and to cut across 
functional boundaries, four  broad levels (known as skillbands) and eight salary ranges replaced more 
than 100 separate grades covering four separate occupational groups - clerical, computing, engineering 
and operator staff - each with their own terms and conditions.  
 
The minimum of each salary range is worth 80 per cent of its maximum. The main exception is the 
sales function where the minimum is worth 70 per cent. Young people and modern apprentices start at 
50 per cent of the maximum  for the relevant salary range. The skillband descriptors, which define the 
skill level required within each of the four skillbands, are as follows: 
 
• skill, 
• experience/knowledge, 
• entry requirements, 
• complexity, 
• customer & commercial breadth, 
• communications/interpersonal, 
• responsibility/discretion. 
 
In order to determine the appropriate salary range for the job within a skillband, job dimensions allied 
with existing and future job descriptions have been developed to analyse further a job’s role and skill 
requirement.  
A.7.5.2 Pay progression  
 
Under the old system, employees received increments on the anniversary date of their appointment. 
Now all staff receive their progression increase on 1 October. This simplifies administration and 
makes it easier to calculate the paybill.  Adult employees receive an annual progression increase worth 
five per cent of the salary range maximum but the agreement allows for fast tracking so that staff can 
receive up to 10 per cent. Although the company has a performance management system, this is not 
directly linked to pay.  Nevertheless, poor performers can have an increment withheld.  
 
 69
Does it work? Evaluating a new pay system     Annex 
There are also a limited number of skill progression points for those jobs that do not fall within the 
standard NewGRID structure.  Although these employees have been assigned to one of the eight salary 
ranges their progression is limited to defined skill progression points. An example is the professional 
sales grades, where bonus payments provide an important part of the pay package.  
 
A.7.5.3 Pay and pension protection  
 
An important part of the agreement is the protection of existing pay, progression and pension 
entitlement. This applies to a minority of employees whose jobs have been assimilated on to the new 
structure at a lower maximum than their old grade and has been achieved through payment of a salary 
supplement to the new salary. These employees will continue to receive progression awards up to the 
new maximum. The supplement does not count for overtime or unsocial hours but is included in 
pensionable earnings and for redundancy pay. As the company seeks to restructure its operations every 
effort will be made to move displaced staff to new areas of business expansion. Where this leads to 
redeployment to a new job on a lower salary range, similar pay and pension protection will apply. 
 
A.7.5.4 Terms and conditions 
 
Before NewGRID, the various bargaining groups had many different terms and condition including 
different hours of work and holiday entitlement (IDS 2001). Under NewGRID, the standard working 
week became 37 hours net from October 2000, moving to 36.5 hours on 31 December 2001 and 36 
hours from 31 December 2002.  
 
NewGRID introduced a common holiday entitlement for all grades with simplified service related 
entitlement from 1 April 2000. From 1 April 2001 all non-management grades received 25 days 
holiday per year, 28 days after 10 years’ service and 30 days after 20 years. (From 1 April 2002 
employees will receive 30 days after 18 years). Staff with holiday entitlement higher than the new 
levels at the time of implementation had existing entitlements protected.    
 
As to premia, Sunday working is now paid at double time. Saturdays no longer attract an unsocial 
hours premium. Night work is paid at time and a third between 9pm and 6am.  Christmas day working 
is paid at triple time and all other bank holidays at two and a half times the hourly rate. Overtime is 
now paid at time-and-a-half Monday to Saturday and time-and-three- quarters on Sundays. Overtime 
is not pensionable unless part of a Sunday shift.  Shift allowance became a new monthly payment, the 
amount depending on the shift pattern. Responsibility allowances were also changed.  These include 
allowances for covering a higher graded job and the long term and short term supervisory allowances. 
NewGRID also introduced a new contractual on-call allowance, where the requirement is part of the 
job. 
 
A.7.5.5 Implementation 
 
Implementation of NewGRID began on 1 October 2000 when all staff moved to the NewGRID salary 
ranges. Changes to basic pay were made where appropriate; new pay and pension protection 
arrangements and changes to allowances were also introduced. The hours harmonisation to 37 hours 
and changes to overtime premia were implemented from 5 October 2000 while improved holiday 
arrangements were introduced from 1 April 2001.  A few issues were left for later discussion. These 
included a common overtime rate for Monday to Sunday; equal opportunities issues; an audit of non-
core arrangements; and efficiency. 
 
According to the union interviewee, the only problem area that has emerged in implementation has 
been the issue of working time reductions. This is because the agreement left attendance procedures 
vague. They are now being dealt with locally.  
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A.7.6  Evaluation 
 
The company says that there has been no specific exercise in monitoring and evaluating the impact of 
NewGRID.  The union stated that ‘in terms of evaluation, very little has been done objectively after 
it’s been implemented’ (CWU interview).  
 
From the management perspective a major issue when approaching the board for approval was the cost 
of the changes. The company says that financial data are the key to measurement of the agreement’s 
impact upon the business. ‘The hard measures used were the projected costs of aligning hours 
modelled against proposed new overtime rates, costs of adjustments to the pay structure, costs 
involved in changing holidays, attendance related premia, allowances etc. This involved a range of 
costs and savings in hard and soft form’ (HR manager’s comments).  
 
NewGRID was not a cost cutting exercise (HR manager’s interview; CWU interview). Each business, 
however, was required to cover the cost of its own implementation of the agreement, but the balance 
of costs and savings varied in different parts of the organisation dependent on the grade make-up of 
their population, ie the extent to which they were affected by various elements of the package. Each 
business is quite distinct and so there has been no general monitoring and evaluation exercise of 
NewGRID. According to the HR manager: ‘Jobs vary quite a lot and the businesses lack the 
uniformity of a manufacturing environment’.  
 
Some aspects of the agreement have clear costs that can be measured and the company is checking 
whether the actual costs are the same as the projected costs. For example, the introduction of the hours 
reduction is a major item that can be costed. But specific benefits are expected from the agreement 
which will offset these costs. Benefits could accrue, for example from changed grades, faster set-up of 
new jobs, faster dispersal of old jobs, incentive arrangements, removal of allowances, savings in 
management time because there is now a single set of standards for staff across all functions. The 
company is seeking to find out how managers are using the new flexibility and whether the new 
attendance arrangements are working. In addition, the businesses are constantly monitoring overtime 
working.  This is not directly related to NewGRID but factors that are of interest in the context of 
developing NewGRID are reductions in overtime from improvements in attendance arrangements, 
overtime patterns and premia costs at different parts of the week. 
 
Changes in productivity directly linked to the new agreement are not being measured. The company 
states that it is difficult to find effective measures of productivity for many of the activities it 
undertakes. The only potential linkage is between incentives and changes in productivity because 
NewGRID enabled the delivery of incentive arrangements. The company’s view is that NewGRID is 
about changing the culture of the organisation and that this will deliver improvements in efficiency 
and productivity. The new agreement gives the company ‘the opportunity to introduce financial 
incentives to change behaviour and hence productivity’ (interview with HR manager). 
 
Recruitment and retention has not been measured in relation to the new agreement although the 
company monitors recruitment and retention on an ongoing basis. The company has been losing 
people at the upper end of the grading structure but this has been more to do with remuneration levels 
in comparison to competitors than the pay and grading system per se. Changes for these people would 
have been necessary even without the new agreement but the new pay structure should mean that these 
people are now retained. At the lower end there were previously few grades available to consider when 
looking to match roles with low pay in the marketplace. The new grading structure opens up the 
potential to recruit new, lower graded people at this level. The HR manager’s view is that, ‘if the pay 
structure is right, this should impact upon staff turnover’. 
 
The company measures customer satisfaction regularly but sees a tenuous link to remuneration 
changes. Where incentive schemes exist (eg for sales staff) there may be some linkage between staff 
performance and greater customer satisfaction but ‘this is not currently measured in any general sense' 
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(interview with HR manager). The major department within the company monitoring the agreement is 
Finance, in conjunction with the employee relations and compensation and benefits departments. 
 
From the union’s perspective, the monitoring of the new agreement is primarily designed to ensure 
that its members receive their correct grading and pay. The CWU commented:: ‘We have got a non-
hierarchical, more simple, unified structure; a common set of terms and conditions; a reduction in the 
working week; pay and pensions protection; and a learning and development statement. We know all 
those have happened’. The union also sees the new single agreement as a protection of national 
bargaining. As to the impact of the agreement on the company’s costs, productivity or employee 
motivation, the union regarded that as a focus for evaluation by management, not the union. 
 
A.7.7 Comment  
 
According to the management interviewee, a major measure of the success of NewGRID has been the 
transition from an outdated pay and grading system to a new ‘cutting edge’ system without losing a 
single day in industrial action. Also, the new pay structure is about changing the culture of the 
organisation, but culture change is a slow process.  
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Glossary 
 
AfC Agenda for Change 
AEEU Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union, merged with MSF to form Amicus in 
Jan 2002. 
C & E Customs and Excise 
CIPD Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development 
CWU Communication Workers Union 
DZ Development zone in the grading structure of BAE Systems 
EP Effective performance – a work study based system at Royal Mail 
EZ Enhanced zone in the grading structure of BAE Systems 
GCG  Government Communications Group – the union at GCHQ 
GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters 
HM Her Majesty 
HR Human resource(s)  
HRM Human resource management 
IES Institute for Employment Studies 
IPM Institute of Personnel Management, now the Chartered Institute of Personnel & 
Development – see above 
JE Job evaluation 
JEP Job Evaluation Project at the Council 
JPG Job Pay Group at GCHQ, ie a functional occupational group 
JWG Joint working group 
MBA  Masters in Business Administration 
MSF Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union, merged with AEEU, see above. 
NJC National Joint Council 
ODA Operating Department Assistant in the NHS 
ODP Operating Department Practitioner in the NHS 
PBS Performance bonus scheme at Royal Mail 
PCS  Public and Commercial Services Union 
PDR Performance development review 
PZ Progression zone in the grading structure of BAE Systems 
RM Royal Mail 
SW software 
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